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A wireless sensor network (WSN) collects and routes information from the 
environment to an aggregation point, known as a sink node. The sink node processes the 
information or acts as a gateway to forward information to another network. Due to its 
essential role in the network, the sink node is a high priority target for an attacker who 
wishes to disable a WSN. In this thesis, we focus on the mitigation of sink-node 
vulnerability in a WSN. Specifically, in this thesis we study the issue of protecting the 
sink node through anonymity techniques. In particular, we use a technique known as k-
anonymity. To achieve k-anonymity, we use a specific routing protocol designed to work 
within the constraints of WSN communication protocols, specifically IEEE 802.15.4. We 
use and modify the Lightweight Ad hoc On-Demand – Next Generation (LOADng) 
reactive-routing protocol to achieve anonymity. This modified protocol prevents an 
attacker from identifying the sink node without adding significant complexity to the 
regular sensor nodes. We simulate the modified LOADng protocol using a custom-
designed simulator in MATLAB. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol and 
also show some of the performance tradeoffs that come with this method. 
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Advances in the miniaturization of integrated circuits, transmitters, and sensing 
devices have facilitated the creation of small-yet-capable remote wireless sensors that can 
be deployed over large areas inexpensively. This has a wide range of applications in both 
military and civilian functions, including environmental monitoring, presence/intrusion 
detection, ranging, imaging, and noise detection [1]. The versatility of remote sensors has 
made them especially appealing for use in military applications.   
The Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 2–10A.5 on remote sensor 
operations [2] details the ways and means in which sensor operations are conducted in the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC). It states that remote sensors provide an economical 
means to expand the commander’s situational awareness on the battlefield by deploying a 
persistent presence to monitor an area-of-interest (AOI) without having to employ troops 
in dangerous and hostile areas. They act as a force multiplier by reducing the requirement 
for personnel and the associated risks when conducting reconnaissance and surveillance 
operations. It is because of these advantages that the use of sensors on the battlefield 
continues to increase. 
In [1], the authors performed a survey of 13 papers covering military applications 
of wireless sensor networks and identified a variety of current and future uses including 
soldier detection and tracking; perimeter protection; chemical, biological, and explosive 
vapor detection; acoustic sensing; and gunshot detection and localization. This wide 
range of applications makes wireless sensor networks a versatile tool that will grow in 
importance on future battlefields. 
A. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a system of specialized devices, or nodes, 
which communicate data from sensor inputs through a wireless medium to a base station, 
which we refer to as the sink node. These devices are generally resource constrained, 
meaning they have enough computational and transmit power to accomplish their task 
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while using as little power as possible. This is especially important for sensors that rely 
on a battery for power and are expected to function for long periods without replacement.   
Sensor nodes are always equipped with a radio frequency (RF) transceiver, a 
transducer for sensing, a microcontroller, and a power supply that is usually a battery [3]. 
A high-level diagram of a typical wireless sensor node architecture is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 Typical Sensor Node Architecture. Source: [3]. Figure 1. 
The transducer acts as the sensor, which collects input from the environment and 
converts that input to analog electrical signals. Those signals are converted to digital 
signals through an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and are sent to the microcontroller 
for processing. The microcontroller processes those inputs, makes decisions based on the 
inputs, and acts on them accordingly. The RF transceiver sends and receives information 
to and from other nodes in the network as instructed by the microcontroller. Sensor nodes 
may also have other capabilities, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), based on the 
information requirements. 
A WSN contains multiple nodes, which are each connected to at least one other 
node utilizing a wireless protocol. The sensor nodes transmit their information through 
the network based on the specific protocols that are implemented. Nodes may be 
designed to perform any combination of sensing, data relaying, or external network data 
communication functions [3]. A node designed for sensing is only able to act as a sensor 
and has to transmit its information to a relaying node to be forwarded through the 
network. The relaying nodes act as routers and forward traffic through the network based 
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on the routing protocol implemented. The sink node is the central node to which data is 
sent by other sensor nodes for processing. It acts as the gateway node between the WSN 
and an outside network. An example of a typical WSN depicting a sensor field and a sink 
node acting as a gateway is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 Structure of a Typical Wireless Sensor Network. Source: [3]. Figure 2. 
The open nature of the WSN environment allows nodes to be easily 
compromised, leading to several security problems. In particular, the sink node, which is 
the aggregation point of all network data, is considered a single point of failure. An attack 
that compromises the sink node results in the network becoming isolated and non-
functioning. This makes the sink node the priority node for an adversary to locate and 
disable. 
B. STANDARDS FOR LOW-POWER COMMUNICATIONS 
The restricted energy and computational requirements of battery-powered remote 
sensor nodes and the unreliable nature of Low-Power Lossy Networks (LLNs) prompted 
the development of new communications protocols. Existing standards, such as Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11, were not designed for the 
requirements of such restricted devices. Additionally, existing routing protocols were too 
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resource demanding for devices with such limited memory and computing power. LLNs 
use the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, which is a data link and physical layer protocol that 
provides communications between low-power devices [4]. Internet Protocol version 6 
(IPv6) over IEEE 802.15.4 low-power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) was 
later developed to address interoperability between LLNs and IPv6-enabled networks.  
6LoWPAN is an open networking standard that provides compatibility between existing 
Internet-connected devices and low-power WSNs. It allows for IP packets to be carried 
within IEEE 802.15.4 link layer frames by reducing the overhead associated with the 
IPv6 protocol.   
C. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to develop a method to provide anonymity to the 
sink node in a WSN while incurring minimal computational overhead to the sensor nodes 
in the network. This allows the use of inexpensive, resource-constrained, low-power 
wireless sensor motes, which reduces the cost of procurement and deployment. 
Deployment of large numbers of these devices over large areas greatly enhances the 
situational awareness of units in the field without being cost-prohibitive. The devices can 
easily be viewed as expendable and can be air-dropped into hostile or contaminated areas 
without fear of losing them. This makes the need to hide the sink node even more critical, 
as the network is more exposed to a hostile attacker in a situation where the network was 
deployed far forward of friendly lines.   
The USMC has employed remote sensors on the battlefield since 1967 during the 
Vietnam War [2]. It currently employs the AN/GSQ-261 Tactical Remote Sensor System 
(TRSS) for remote sensor operations within an AOI. The sensors in this system are 
capable of detecting the presence and movement of vehicles and personnel and can 
operate continuously for 30 days on internal batteries [2]. The data from the sensors is 
relayed back to the AN/MSC-77 Sensor Mobile Monitoring System (SMMS) for 
processing. The SMMS acts as the sink node for the WSN and is critical to the function 
of the entire network. 
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While the AN/GSQ-261 is a capable system that enhances the capabilities of the 
USMC, it is large and requires sensor nodes to be manually placed, potentially putting 
personnel at risk if placed forward of friendly lines. There is a potential for smaller and 
more resource-constrained devices, which can easily be air dropped into an area or placed 
in large numbers by units on patrol. These devices can provide a similar remote sensing 
capability as the AN/GSQ-261’s sensor nodes while being much more cost effective and 
expendable. There are a wide range of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions that 
can economically provide this capability with minor modifications [5]. These sensors 
require the use of more power-friendly communications protocols while still maintaining 
security and their ability to transmit data back to the monitoring station. 
Power-friendly communication protocols such as 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 
are prime candidates for maintaining connectivity in WSNs. In this thesis research, we 
focus on the mitigation of sink node vulnerability in a WSN used at the tactical edge by 
the U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically, in this thesis research, we study the issue of 
protecting the sink node through anonymity techniques. In particular, we use a technique 
known as k-anonymity to obfuscate the actual sink node. To achieve k-anonymity, we use 
a specific routing protocol designed to work within the constraints of IEEE 802.15.4 and 
6LoWPAN. For this thesis research, we modify the Lightweight Ad hoc On-Demand – 
Next Generation (LOADng) reactive, or on-demand, routing protocol. 
D. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
To achieve the above stated objectives, we develop a modification to the 
LOADng routing protocol that accomplishes sink-node anonymity while adding minimal 
computational overhead to the resource constrained sensor nodes.   
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 Development of a modified LOADng routing protocol that provides k-
anonymity to the sink node while limiting the computational overhead for 
the sensor nodes. 
 Simulation of the modified routing algorithm to measure and quantify 
anonymity and performance versus the standard LOADng protocol. 
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 Measurement of the performance of the modified routing algorithm 
compared to the standard LOADng protocol for average route length, 
latency, power consumption, and packet delivery ratio (PDR). 
During our literature search, we found no other research that merges k-anonymity 
for the sink node with reactive routing protocols.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we cover 
relevant background information and discuss some of the previous research done on this 
topic. The method used to determine anonymity as well as how sink node anonymity is 
achieved are discussed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, we cover how the experiment was 
designed, implemented, and run to compute specific performance metrics. In Chapter V, 
the results of the simulation are presented and discussed in relation to the metrics 
measured. In Chapter VI, we conclude this thesis and discuss future work topics. All code 
for the implemented simulation is included in the appendix. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we introduced to the concept of WSNs and their application in the 
Department of Defense (DOD). Research motivations and the objectives of this thesis 
were discussed, followed by a brief outline of the contributions of this thesis. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we discuss some of the protocols that are developed for different 
layers of the WSN protocol stack as well as some existing research into sink node 
anonymity. This lays the informational foundation for the later discussions of our 
implemented protocol and its application to sink node anonymity in WSNs.   
A. IEEE 802.15.4 STANDARD OVERVIEW 
The IEEE chartered the IEEE 802.15 Task Group 4 to address the need for a 
wireless standard for low complexity devices that require low data rate and low power 
consumption. This led to the publication of the IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard in 2003, 
which was superseded by the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 standard. The standard contains the 
following features [4]: 
 Data rates of 250 kbps, 40 kbps, and 20 kbps. 
 Two addressing modes; 16-bit short and 64-bit IEEE addressing. 
 Support for critical latency devices, such as joysticks. 
 Carrier-Sense Multiple-Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
channel access. 
 Automatic network establishment by the coordinator. 
 Handshaking protocol for transfer reliability. 
 Power management to ensure low power consumption. 
 Sixteen channels in the 2.4-GHz ISM band, ten channels in the 915-MHz 
band, and one channel in the 868-MHz band. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is designed to provide Low-Rate Wireless Personal 
Area Network (LR-WPAN) capabilities for devices with constrained power and 
computation resources that only require low data throughput [3]. The IEEE 802.15.4 
standard outlines the specification for the physical and MAC layers of the WSN protocol 
stack. Other protocols must be used to implement the higher layer functions of the WSN 
protocol stack.   
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We are specifically interested in the security implementation at the MAC layer, 
which is a critical component of protecting the sink node. The IEEE 820.15.4 standard 
designates MAC layer encryption using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-128 with 
128-bit symmetric keys as specified in FIPS Pub 197 [4]. When implemented in 
accordance with FIPS 140–2, this encryption meets the DOD requirements for 
communications transmission security [6]. 
B. 6LOWPAN 
6LoWPAN was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a 
means to enable IPv6 to be used on low-power IEEE 802.15.4 WSNs [3]. This enables 
sensors to communicate directly on the Internet without having to utilize a gateway to 
translate between protocols. The challenge for designers of this protocol was fitting the 
IPv6 header, which is 40 bytes, within an IEEE 802.15.4 frame, which is limited to 127 
bytes total. The 25-byte MAC frame header and optional 21-byte encryption header leave 
just 81 bytes for upper layer headers and payload data [7]. 
6LoWPAN adds an adaptation layer between the MAC and network layers to 
provide header compression in IEEE 802.15.4 networks and fragmentation and 
reassembly when transitioning between networks which use the standard IPv6 1280-byte 
maximum transmit unit (MTU) [8]. The adaptation layer compresses the IPv6 header to 
two, 12, or 20 bytes depending on the node’s knowledge of its destination. Fragmentation 
and mesh headers of four to five bytes and five to 17 bytes, respectively, are added as 
needed to support fragmentation of larger IPv6 packets and multi-hop routing [8]. This 
dramatically reduces the header size of IPv6, allowing its use in the restricted IEEE 
802.15.4 frame. 
C. REACTIVE VERSUS PROACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Reactive, or on-demand, routing protocols differ from proactive routing protocols, 
such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) and Routing Information Protocol (RIP), in that 
nodes only determine a route to a destination when they need to send data. There are no 
periodic control packets sent throughout the network for route maintenance, and the 
nodes do not maintain large routing tables with a full picture of the network as is required 
9 
in a proactive protocol. Each node only maintains routes to nodes for which it needs to 
send data. Due to these characteristics, they are well suited to run on devices that are 
restricted in computational power and memory. According to Clausen et al. [9], we see 
that reactive protocols are preferable to proactive protocols under the following 
conditions:  
 Few concurrent traffic flows in the network (i.e., traffic flows only
between few sources and destinations);
 Low data traffic overall, and, therefore, the traffic load from periodic
signaling (for proactive protocols) is greater than the traffic load from
flooding route requests (for reactive protocols);
 State requirements on the router are very stringent; i.e., it is beneficial to
store only few routes on a router.
Reactive routing protocols have an advantage over proactive protocols in low-
traffic Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) because they tend to use less power in many 
scenarios [10], [11]. This is important when using battery-powered sensors that need to 
function for long periods on their own internal power. This is especially true in sensor 
networks that may sit for long periods before a sensor is triggered and needs to send data. 
In a proactive protocol, route updates are sent out periodically even if there is no event to 
trigger a data transmission, using more power each time. A reactive protocol only 
attempts to determine a route when it needs to send data to another node, conserving 
power.    
D. LIGHTWEIGHT AD HOC ON-DEMAND—NEXT GENERATION 
(LOADng) ROUTING PROTOCOL  
The LOADng routing protocol is a reactive routing protocol developed for use in 
MANETs and is currently a draft at the IETF Network Working Group [9]. It was derived 
from the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, which was 
originally published in 2003 in Request for Comments (RFC) 3561 by the IETF. 
6LoWPAN Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (LOAD) was the first 
derivative of AODV developed by the 6LoWPAN working group, but development was 
suspended while the group worked out adapting IPv6 for IEEE 802.15.4 [12]. LOAD was 
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designed as a layer-2 mesh under protocol and was designated as the routing protocol for 
utility metering networks by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 
recommendation ITU-T G.9903. Despite the suspension, development of AODV 
derivatives continued, and LOADng was created as an improvement to LOAD that also 
offered the ability to work as a layer-3 route over protocol [12]. The ITU superseded 
LOAD with LOADng in the recommendation ITU-T G.9903 in May 2013. 
1. Overview of LOADng   
As the name implies, LOADng is a lightweight protocol designed for use in 
devices that are resource constrained. It eliminates some of the functions of AODV while 
maintaining the core ability to provide end-to-end routing efficiently. In AODV, each 
node maintains a precursor list, which has the IP addresses of all other nodes that it thinks 
will use it as a next hop to all destinations. LOADng does not have precursor lists and 
only cares about its next hop to a destination, reducing the memory requirement in the 
sensor nodes. 
AODV allows an intermediate node to respond to a route request (RREQ) if it has 
a route to the destination. LOADng only allows the destination to respond to RREQs, 
which serves to lower the amount of network traffic and simplifies the protocol. This 
tends to further highlight the sink node since all route replies (RREPs) come from the 
sink node, assuming the traffic from the sensors is all destined for the sink node.   
LOADng allows for protocol extensions through the use of Type-Length-Value 
(TLV) elements, making it possible to provide additional functionality to the protocol 
easily. The ability to modify LOADng is a key characteristic and one of the main reasons 
it was chosen for the application discussed in this thesis. 
2. Operation of the LOADng Protocol 
As a reactive routing protocol, LOADng accomplishes route discovery through 
the use of RREQ, RREP, and RREP acknowledge (RREP_ACK) packets. In the 
following sections, we detail the operation of the route-discovery process. 
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a. Route Requests 
When a node has data it needs to send to another node, the source node first 
determines whether it has a route-tuple to the destination node in its routing set. Each 
tuple contains the next-hop node address and the routing metric used to obtain the route 
towards the destination [9]. If there is a route, the source node simply unicasts a data 
packet to the destination node. If there is no route in the routing set, the source node 
generates a RREQ packet and floods the RREQ packet to its neighbors. The RREQ 
packet is flooded through the entire network until all nodes have received the packet or 
the packet hop limit is exceeded. When each node receives the RREQ, the node updates 
its routing set by updating an existing route-tuple or adding a new tuple with a route to 
the source address in the RREQ. This generates the reverse route, as each node receiving 
the RREQ generates a route-tuple to the source node. The node then checks the 
destination address to determine if it is the destination. If it is not the destination, the 
node continues flooding the RREQ in accordance with the flooding scheme implemented. 
LOADng supports optimized flooding, which reduces overhead when compared to 
classical flooding.   
b. Route Replies 
If the node is the destination, it generates a RREP message and unicasts it back to 
the source via the reverse route. As each node receives the RREP, it similarly updates or 
creates a tuple in its routing set with a route to the RREP originator. This creates the 
forward route toward the RREP source node. The node then determines if it is the 
destination for the RREP. If it is not the destination, the node forwards the RREP packet 
based on the reverse route generated in the RREQ flooding that was executed previously. 
An example of the RREQ and RREP process for the LOADng protocol with the route 
numbers showing the hop count from the source is shown in Figure 3. 
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RREQ Flooding and RREP Unicast for LOADng Routing Protocol Figure 3. 
c. Route Reply Acknowledgement
If it is the destination of the RREP, the node generates a RREP_ACK packet and 
unicasts it to the source of the RREP via the forward route. If the node has data to send, it 
then sends the data to the destination node via the same forward route.   
d. Route Errors
If any node in the route determines that the route is broken at any time, it 
generates a Route Error (RERR) message and unicasts it back to the source node of the 
packet it was attempting to forward. Upon receipt of the RERR, the source node sends a 
new RREQ to establish a new forward route to the destination. 
3. LOADng Performance Comparisons
LOADng was chosen for this research due to its low resource overhead for sensor 
nodes and its good performance compared to other WSN routing protocols. When 
compared to the Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks (RPL), a 
proactive routing-distance vector protocol for MANETS, it was found that LOADng 
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showed significantly lower network overhead while maintaining a better PDR and 
average path length [12]. It did show a longer end-to-end delay due to the route discovery 
process required before it is able to send data. When compared to AODV, LOADng 
showed better PDR and significantly less routing overhead in multi-point to point 
scenarios, which is what we are interested in for this thesis research. It did show higher 
average end-to-end delay as node density increased, which is likely due to intermediate 
nodes not sending RREPs in LOADng [7]. 
E. APPROACHES TO PRIVACY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
There are many approaches to achieving sink node anonymity, each of which 
makes certain assumptions about the capabilities of the sensor nodes. Sink node 
anonymity is often a tradeoff between the level of anonymity and latency, power 
consumption, node complexity, and PDR. Our design does not assume that the nodes 
have prior knowledge of the network layout or the ability to determine their physical 
location. The only assumption is that the nodes know the address of the sink node and 
have been configured with the same symmetric key prior to deployment. Knowing this, it 
is useful to examine some other methods for achieving sink node anonymity   
1. False Packet Injection 
One of the simplest anonymity schemes involves injecting false packets into the 
network to deceive an adversary by making it difficult to recognize traffic patterns. Since 
there is generally more traffic from nodes closer to the sink node, the sink node’s location 
can quickly be determined by a global observer. This method seeks to make this more 
difficult by increasing the traffic in areas that normally have lower traffic. This method can 
range from a packet being sent to every node in the network to more advanced methods 
that create false packets only in the areas that normally have lower traffic volume. 
Deng et al. [13] proposed a method called fractal propagation to create false 
packets in a WSN. When a node hears that one of its neighbors is sending a packet to the 
sink node, that node generates a fake packet with a probability pc. This packet is sent to a 
random neighbor node, which in turn forwards to another random neighbor node, 
continuing until k nodes have forwarded the packet. Additionally, another neighbor of the 
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original fake packet generating node creates a fake packet with a probability pc and hop 
limit k – 1. This creates traffic away from the sink node and obscures the location of the 
sink node. This method creates a lot of unneeded traffic and may still not provide 
anonymity to the sink node because of the uncontrolled routing of the fake packets. The 
authors add more routing control to the scheme to create pockets of increased traffic, but 
this increases the complexity of the routing algorithm. 
2. Deceptive Sink Nodes 
One approach to hiding the location of the sink node is to route traffic to nodes 
that act as decoy sink nodes. This hides the sink node from a global adversary because 
the traffic never actually traverses the sink node. Base-station Location Anonymity and 
Security Technique (BLAST) [14] utilizes a ring of nodes around the sink node that act 
as endpoints for the traffic to the sink node. When a node sends traffic, it chooses one of 
the blast nodes to act as the endpoint, which then transmits the packet with a range that 
covers all of the other blast nodes and the sink node. This creates a ring of protective 
nodes around the sink node, masking the identity of the sink node. Each time a node 
transmits, it chooses a different blast node as the destination. This provides anonymity for 
the sink node from a global attacker but adds computational burden to the nodes and does 
not account for how the routes are learned. In addition, it assumes that all nodes know the 
address of all of the blast nodes and assumes routes have already been established. By not 
addressing the route discovery process, we see that this method leaves a potential 
vulnerability that can highlight the sink node. 
3. Location-Aided Routing 
Location-aided routing anonymity schemes require that the nodes know their 
physical location and that of the other nodes. This requires additional hardware, such as 
GPS or a dedicated location server, so each node knows its physical location. The 
Anonymous Location-Based Efficient Routing Protocol (ALERT) [15] protocol utilizes 
location-aided routing to provide anonymity to a destination node. When a node wants to 
transmit to a destination, the node partitions the physical space and chooses a random 
forwarder node in the neighboring partition and forwards the packet to it. This random 
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forwarder executes the same partitioning and forwarding. This continues until the 
partition with a random forwarder and the destination node contains a number of nodes n 
where n k . At this point, the random forwarder broadcasts the packet, so all of the 
nodes, including the destination, can see the packet. This provides anonymity to the 
destination node because a global observer cannot distinguish the destination node from 
the other nodes in the partition. This scheme also has the advantage of being able to 
obscure the identity of any chosen destination; however, ALERT requires the use of a 
dedicated location server to tell the nodes where the other nodes are. This can be very 
impractical in an ad hoc network, especially one that is deployed in a combat zone. There 
is also additional cryptographic and message overhead for the dissemination of 
information on the nodes’ location.   
4. Cluster Head Routing 
The authors of [16] and [17] segment their networks into clusters and utilize 
cluster heads (CHs) to act as the gateway for traffic leaving each cluster. CH routing is a 
common technique used in WSNs and can have the advantage of saving energy in a flat 
topology [16]. If all nodes have the capability, CHs can be rotated to conserve power and 
extend the life of the network. The traffic is routed to adjacent clusters through the CHs 
until it reaches the sink node’s CH. The sink node’s CH then broadcasts the traffic to 
allow the sink node to receive the data. This approach provides anonymity for the sink 
node among the members of its cluster but assumes that the nodes have the ability to elect 
their CHs and the CHs have the ability to build routes through adjacent CHs. This 
requires additional computational capabilities for all nodes that may become CHs, which 
increases cost and energy consumption. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed common WSN protocols, specifically IEEE 802.15.4 
and 6LoWPAN. We also introduced the LOADng routing protocol that is used in this 
thesis research to achieve sink node anonymity. The discussion of these protocols builds a 
foundation of knowledge for the remainder of this thesis. Other related methods for sink 
node anonymity were presented, detailing their strengths and drawbacks relating to WSNs.   
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III. ACHIEVING SINK-NODE ANONYMITY IN REACTIVE 
ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Reactive routing protocols present a unique challenge to the problem of masking 
the identity of the sink node. As discussed previously, the act of route discovery through 
the flooding of RREQ packets and the RREP response quickly highlights the sink node;  
however, reactive protocols offer distinct advantages in their lower computational 
overhead and power consumption when compared to proactive protocols [10], [11]. In 
order to obfuscate the identity of the sink node, the traffic to the sink node must be 
indistinguishable from a set of other nodes in the network. In the following sections, we 
discuss the scheme used to anonymize the sink node as well as the modification to the 
LOADng routing protocol to achieve that anonymity. 
A. K-ANONYMITY  
K-anonymity was first proposed in 2002 [18]. The original premise of the theory 
related to protecting the identity of patients in a database by ensuring that accessible data 
does not link a specific record to an individual person. If multiple pieces of identifying 
information are put together in a patient record, and any of those pieces of information 
are unique, then a patient can be identified and linked to the medical condition associated 
with that record. By taking steps to ensure none of the personal information uniquely 
identifies an individual within the set of patients, a level of anonymity is provided to the 
patients.   
The authors of [18] demonstrate the k-anonymity principle using a table 
1( ,..., )nRT A A  with RTQI  as the quasi-identifying information associated with the table. 
If there are at least k occurrences of each sequence of values that appear in [ ]RTRT QI , 
the table is k-anonymous, where k is the smallest number of identical sequences. The 
example table containing patient quasi-identifying information is shown in Table 1. In 
this example, { , , , }QI Race Birth Gender ZIP  since the data in the problem column of 
Table 1 are not quasi-identifiers. 
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Table 1.   Example of k-Anonymity, where k = 2 and QI = {Race, Birth, Gender, 
ZIP}. Source: [18]. 
 Race Birth Gender ZIP Problem 
t1 Black 1965 m 0214* short breath 
t2 Black 1965 m 0214* chest pain 
t3 Black 1965 f 0213* hypertension 
t4 Black 1965 f 0213* hypertension 
t5 Black 1964 f 0213* obesity 
t6 Black 1964 f 0213* chest pain 
t7 White 1964 m 0213* chest pain 
t8 White 1964 m 0213* obesity 
t9 White 1964 m 0213* short breath 
t10 White 1967 m 0213* chest pain 
t11 White 1967 m 0213* chest pain 
 
Sets (t1, t2) and (t10, t11) each contain identical quasi-identifying information 
among the records in their set. The data in Table 1 has a k value of two because there are 
at least two occurrences of each sequence of quasi-identifiers in the table. It is not 
possible to identify the person associated to a problem with certainty because of the 
anonymity provided by the information in the table. As long as k remains greater than 
one, this is true. If record t11 were removed, record t10 would be unique since the birth 
date of 1967 is different from records t7, t8, and t9 despite the rest of the information 
being identical. In this case, k = 1, and there is not anonymity for record t10. 
B. APPLICATION OF K-ANONYMITY IN WSNS 
For k-anonymity in a WSN, we are making the assumption that the attacker 
knows limited information about the network traffic because the communications are 
encrypted at the MAC layer; however, the attacker could begin to build a basic 
understanding of the types of traffic in the network from passively observing the traffic. 
Passive observation enables one to determine the types of traffic based on the length of 
the transmission time, number of bits in a packet, and the order of transmissions between 
nodes.   
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1. Identification of the Sink Node through Passive Observation 
The transmission times for LOADng packets encapsulated in IEEE 802.15.4 
frames using the maximum transmission speed of 250 kbps is shown in Table 2. We 
assume that the frames are not padded and the network is encrypting the traffic at Layer 2 
using AES-128, so there is no change to the frame size. A full frame for IEEE 802.15.4 is 
limited to 127 bytes [4]. The frame header is 25 bytes and the encryption overhead is 21 
bytes, leaving 81 bytes for the frame payload [4]. 
Table 2.   Size of LOADng Packets in Bytes and Transmission Time Based on 
250-kbps Data Rate 
Packet Type Packet Size (bytes) Frame Size (bytes) Transmission Time (ms) 
RREQ 30 76 2.432 
RREP 34 80 2.56 
RREP_ACK 18 64 2.048 
Data 81 127 4.064 
RERR 30 76 2.432 
 
Transmission rates may vary within a wireless network due to link quality and 
congestion, which can make determining frame types by time difficult but not impossible. 
Unless there is padding of the packets, the attacker may be able to see the number of bits 
in each transmission even if the traffic is encrypted. This makes the bit-rate irrelevant and 
makes the system more vulnerable. 
In a WSN, it is assumed that the majority of the traffic is destined for the sink 
node; therefore, a majority of the RREQs that are sent have the sink node as the 
destination. Once the RREQs are received, the sink node does not forward RREQs any 
further. If this is the case, the majority of the RREP packets originate from the sink node, 
and the majority of the RREP_ACK and data packets are destined for the sink node. By 
observing the traffic and determining the ratio of the RREPs sent to the RREQs 
forwarded, the attacker can determine where the majority of packets are destined and 
conclude that this is the sink node. Additionally, once the network has converged and the 
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majority of traffic is data to the sink node, it is easy for an attacker to determine the sink 
node.   
2. Obscuring the Sink Node through k-Anonymity   
The k-anonymity principle in a WSN seeks to prevent sink node identification by 
having at least one node act similarly to the sink node. By altering the traffic patterns, we 
find it is possible to change the behavior of the sink node and its neighbor nodes so that 
they are similar enough to be indistinguishable to an attacker. This is equivalent to patient 
records having the same identifiable information among multiple patient records [18]. As 
k increases, that identification becomes more difficult. 
Let N  be the set of all nodes and SNN  be the set of nodes that include the sink 
node and its one-hop neighbors where SNN N . If the sink node is indistinguishable 
from the other nodes in SNN , then SNk N . We determine the distinguishability of the 
sink node by looking at two parameters: the total number of transmissions and the ratio of 
RREP to RREQ packets sent for each node in SNN . With these numbers, we can measure 
the standard deviation among the nodes to determine how easy it is to identify the sink 
node among its neighbors. Using 
iSN
T  as the number of transmissions or the ratio of 
RREP to RREQ packets for node 
iSN
N  and SN  as the mean, we can calculate the 



























  .  (2)  
If the number of sink node transmissions and the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets 
are both within one standard deviation of the mean SN , then the sink node cannot be 
distinguished from its neighbor nodes and is considered k-anonymous where SNk N . 
With ST  as the number of transmissions or the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets for the 
sink node, the sink is k-anonymous if it satisfies the inequality 
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 S SN SNT    .  (3) 
The advantage of this system is that even if the sink node’s behavior falls outside 
of one standard deviation of the mean, it may still be anonymous within a smaller subset 
of nodes. For example, assume that a sink node has seven neighbors ( 8SNN  ) and its 
number of transmissions is greater than 
SN  by more than one standard deviation. It is 
possible that there is one node in the set that has a very low transmission number that is 
causing the mean of the set of nodes to go down. Removing this node from the set raises 
the mean and may bring the sink node within one standard deviation of this new set, 
yielding 7k  .   
C. MODIFIED LOADNG FOR SINK-NODE ANONYMITY 
Our method obscures the identity of the sink node by employing the k-anonymity 
metric previously described. The sink node’s identity is hidden to an adversary by using 
additional nodes that act as the sink node, making it difficult for anyone observing from 
the outside to determine which node is actually the sink node. This is a common 
technique employed using different methods in numerous anonymity schemes in wireless 
sensor networks. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to sink-node anonymity has 
not been accomplished utilizing a reactive, or on-demand, routing protocol.   Due to the 
nature of reactive routing protocols, maintaining anonymity of the sink node can be 
difficult to accomplish. 
1. Protocol Overview 
As noted previously, the sink node is particularly vulnerable to identification, 
even if the traffic is encrypted because a majority of the traffic in the network is destined 
for this node. By observing the frequency of the transmissions from the node, an 
adversary can quickly determine the importance of the node and determine with a high 
level of certainty that this is, at the very least, a high priority node. 
Our scheme works by developing a zone of regular nodes around the sink node. 
The nodes within this zone act as false endpoints for the traffic. The nodes that are one-
hop neighbors to the sink node are chosen to be part of the zone. This is because the one-
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hop neighbors are within transmission range of the sink node, thereby allowing the sink 
node to have knowledge about the various routes each of its one-hop neighbors has in its 
routing set. In other words, the sink node knows all of the other nodes to which its one-
hop neighbors have routes. This information is necessary in order for the modified 
LOADng protocol to operate efficiently. The sink node does not know the routes that 
non-neighbor nodes have, so they are not used as part of the zone. 
2. Choosing a Neighbor Node 
Since all nodes in the network build their knowledge of the network through the 
use of RREQ packets, it is critical for efficient routing that some RREQ packets from the 
source node(s) reach the sink node. The sink node must have an understanding of which 
of its neighbor nodes have active routes to the node requesting a route (source node). In 
order to ensure this, the sink node must not respond to the first RREQ it receives from 
each node in the network. The sink node sees which of its neighbors have forwarded the 
RREQ and knows that this neighbor node has a route to the source node. When the 
timeout for the RREQ expires, the source node floods another RREQ packet through the 
network.   
When the sink node receives the second RREQ from this source node, it looks in 
its routing set and finds all nodes, including itself, which have a route to the source. Of 
these, it excludes those nodes that the sink node knows have already forwarded the new 
RREQ. This is critical because if a node is seen forwarding a RREQ and then sending a 
RREP, an adversary might assume that this node is not the sink node. From the nodes that 
are left, including itself, the sink node chooses one node to act as the sink node.   
3. Forwarding the Altered RREQ and Sending the RREP 
If the sink node does not choose itself, it alters the RREQ packet by changing the 
destination address to the chosen neighbor node and setting the sink flag in the packet. 
This flag tells the chosen neighbor node that it is acting as the sink node and relays to the 
source node that any future packets destined for the sink node need to go to this address. 
The sink node then continues flooding the altered RREQ, acting as a normal node. When 
the chosen neighbor node receives the RREQ, it creates a RREP packet with the sink flag 
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set and unicasts it back to the source node. If the sink node chooses itself, it creates a 
RREP packet with the sink flag set and unicasts it back to the source node. An example of 
the RREQ and RREP packets is shown in Figure 4 with link numbers indicating the hop 
count from the source node. 
 
 Example of RREQ Flooding and RREP Unicast for the Modified Figure 4. 
LOADng Routing Protocol  
The addition of the sink flag to the RREP, RREP_ACK, and data packets is 
accomplished through a protocol extension enabled by TLV elements.   The extension 
adds an additional TLV element of type FLAGS as defined in [9] to the RREP_ACK and 
data headers since the RREP already contains the TLV. Bits 1–7 are reserved for future 
use in this TLV, allowing us to use bit 1 for the sink flag. RREQ packets do not require 
the addition of the sink flag since it is not used in the route discovery process. A RREP 
header with the FLAGS TLV highlighted is shown in Figure 5. The Values field contains 
the eight bits used in this TLV. 
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 RREP Packet Header with FLAGS TLV Highlighted. Source: [9]. Figure 5. 
4. RREP_ACK and Data Packets 
Upon receiving the RREP, the source node first sends a RREP_ACK to the source 
address in the RREP. It then sends its data packet(s) to the same address. Upon receipt of 
a data packet, the destination node, whether the actual sink node or a chosen neighbor, 
sends a broadcast of the data packet with the sink flag set. All neighbor nodes see the 
broadcast, but only the actual sink node accepts the packet since the sink flag is set. It is 
important that the actual sink node also broadcast if it is the destination to ensure that it is 
behaving the same as the fake sink nodes.   
D. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS  
Since the traffic is assumed to be encrypted at Layer 2, the adversary is not able to 
see any of the Layer 3 header information. This is important because if the Layer 3 
header was visible, the address of the sink node can easily be determined using a simple 
packet sniffer, and finding the address of the node to which the majority of the traffic is 
destined would be trivial. A potential issue is when the sink node changes the RREQ 
destination address, the adversary can see a change in the encrypted packet and determine 
that this node is the sink node. If there is no change to the underlying frame information 
as it is routed through the network, there is no change to the cipher text visible to the 
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observer. When the sink node alters the RREQ by changing the destination address and 
sink flag, it causes a change in the cipher text. This signifies a change in the underlying 
frame information and alerts the observer that this is the sink node. The RREQ header 
contains a hop count field, which is incremented as each node forwards the packet. In 
other words, the hop count field also changes as the frame moves through the network. 
Under the principle of cryptographic diffusion, this one-bit change creates a large change 
in the encrypted packet as it moves through the network; therefore, changing the 
destination node and the sink flag are not distinguishable to the adversary. 
This protocol puts the majority of the requirements on the sink node, which 
generally has more resources than the sensor nodes [3]. The only change to the routing 
protocol for the sensor nodes is the addition of the sink flag. The nodes must be aware of 
the sink flag for the purpose of routing traffic to the sink node and to signal to the 
destination node that it must broadcast.   
Other than these modifications, there are no changes made to the LOADng 
protocol. This was done to ensure as little computational overhead as possible for the 
sensor nodes. The modified LOADng is designed to function on nodes with very basic 
capabilities and assumes that the nodes only have the ability to wirelessly communicate 
with neighbors in accordance with IEEE 802.15.4 and store route tuples as defined in the 
LOADng protocol. The nodes do not need to have any pre-defined knowledge of their 
physical location or network topology for this scheme to work as some other anonymity 
schemes require. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In Chapter III, we discussed the anonymity scheme used to hide the identity of the 
sink node in a WSN. A background of the k-anonymity principle was outlined as well as 
its use to quantify the anonymity of a node relative to a set of other nodes. As long as the 
sink node’s number of transmissions and its RREP-to-RREQ forwarded ratio values fall 
within one standard deviation of the mean of those values for a set SNN , which includes 
the sink node and its neighbors, the sink node is said to the k-anonymous with SNk N . 
The modified LOADng routing protocol achieves this by choosing a node from a subset 
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of SNN  to reply to a RREQ, which then continues to act as the endpoint for future 
transmissions from that source node. The modified LOADng protocol was discussed. The 
design considerations that were taken into account during the development of the 
modified LOADng protocol to achieve k-anonymity were addressed. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
All simulations were designed and run in a custom simulator built in MATLAB. 
The simulator is designed to simulate any number of sensor nodes in either a uniform 
spacing or a random distribution. This flexibility allows the testing of the effectiveness of 
the modified LOADng protocol in the scenarios of deliberate or random placement of 
nodes. In each simulation, five metrics were measured: sink-node anonymity, average 
route length, latency, power use, and PDR. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
The experimental parameters for the simulation are discussed in the following 
sections. In particular, the transmission range of the nodes, the number of nodes, and the 
spacing between them are discussed. We also describe how power consumption is 
measured within the simulations. 
1. Selecting Sensor Parameters 
The type of sensor node and the transmission range requirements of the nodes is 
not the focus of this thesis research and are not taken into account in the determination of 
range. Many available COTS IEEE 802.15.4 transmitters that operate at 1-dBm transmit 
power have a maximum unimpeded line-of-sight range up to 100.0 m. Accordingly, we 
chose the transmission range of the nodes to be 50.0 m. We assume that the maximum 
transmission range and any signal degradation due to range do not greatly impact the 
outcomes of the experiments. We make this assumption because we are comparing the 
performance between LOADng and our modified LOADng protocol on identically 
distributed networks under identical circumstances; therefore, any change in data rate due 
to transmission range is assumed be the same between the two networks and will not 
change the outcome of the experiment.   
2. Determining Node Quantities 
The number of nodes for a uniform distribution was determined based on the size 
of the field and the transmission range of the sensor motes. Using a transmission range of 
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50.0 m, we modeled the transmission area as a circle with a radius of 50.0 m with the 
sensor mote situated at the center. Using a right triangle with the hypotenuse as the 
diameter of the circle (100.0 m), the length of the other two sides is 70.71 m each. 
Spacing the sensor motes 35.35 m apart is the minimum requirement to provide 
transmission coverage for the entire area and requires 205 sensor motes to cover a 
500×500 m
2
 area if the sensors are deployed to the edges. The geometric representation 
of the calculation of the uniform node spacing is shown in Figure 6.   
 
 Uniform Spacing of Sensor Nodes Figure 6. 
This calculation works for uniformly spaced sensors but often caused problems 
when the sensor motes were placed using a random distribution. With the random 
distribution, there were often pockets of nodes isolated from the sink node, meaning their 
traffic always failed to reach the sink node. An example of a simulation in which there is 
a pocket of isolated nodes in a random distribution is shown in Figure 7.  
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 Isolated Pocket of Nodes in a Random Distribution within a Figure 7. 
500×500 m
2
 Field Containing 205 Nodes 
Through experimentation, we found that increasing the number of sensor nodes 
by approximately 25% dramatically reduced the occurrences of isolation for a random 
distribution; therefore, for the same field size of 500×500 m
2
, we chose to deploy 250 
nodes for a random distribution. For the uniform spacing, 196 nodes were chosen because 
it provides an even 14×14 sensor node field. This maintains the same node neighbors as 
205 nodes because the small distance increase between sensors does not extend the 
distances beyond the 50.0-m range. The size of the field was chosen to be 500×500 m
2
 to 
ensure there was a large sample set of nodes outside the transmission range of the sink 
node. This allows for numerous hops between nodes on the edge of the field and the sink 
node. We assume that there is only one sink node in the network. 
3. Measuring Power Consumption 
When measuring power consumption, we assumed that nodes are in three general 
states: idle, receiving, and transmitting. Receiving and transmitting encompass all 
functions to go from the idle state, complete their task, and return to the idle state. In 
Table 3, the power consumption values used to determine power usage during the 
transmit and receive phases are shown.  
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Table 3.   Phases of Node Operations and Power Usage. Adapted from [19]. 





44 mW 1.5 ms 1.833×10
-5
 mWh 
 Receive 66 mW 32 µs/Byte 5.867×10
-7
 mWh 
CSMA/CA  72 mW 1 ms 2×10
-5
 mWh 
RX-TX switch  54 mW 0.4 ms 6×10
-6
 mWh 
Transmit  90 mW 32 µs/Byte 8×10
-7
 mWh 




The energy consumption for transmitting a full 127-byte IEEE 802.15.4 frame is 
1.55×10
-4
 mWh, while the energy to receive the same frame is 1.02×10
-4
 mWh. The case 
when the node enters the CSMA/CA state and finds that it cannot transmit must also be 
taken into account. In this case, the node skips the RX-TX switch and transmit states and 
goes straight to the post-processing state before going to idle. 
In addition to the above power consumption, we need to account for the power 
consumed during the cryptographic key setup, encryption, and decryption for AES-128. 
This must be taken into account at each node since the encryption is executed at the MAC 
layer. Every node needs to decrypt each packet it receives and encrypts each packet it 
transmits. The power used by a node during the encryption and decryption phases is 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Power Consumption for AES Encryption and Decryption. 
Adapted from [20]. 
 Key size (bits) Duration Power Used 
Encryption 128 1.53 ms 1.09×10
-5
 mWh 




B. SIMULATOR DESIGN 
All simulations were performed with a custom simulator designed in MATLAB. 
The network for the modified LOADng protocol is simulated first followed by the 
simulation for the standard LOADng protocol using identical node distributions, transmit 
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order, and transmit times. The simulator works by placing nodes into different matrices 
when they enter certain states and associates a timer with that node. For each iteration of 
the simulator, all timers are decremented by 100 μs. When a timer reaches zero, the 
simulator acts on that node based on the function it is currently performing. In the 
following sections, we elaborate on the details of the simulator. 
1. Building the Network 
The user is initially prompted for the number of nodes, the size of the field, the 
transmission range, the number of transmissions, and whether it is a uniform spacing or 
random distribution. The simulator builds the physical distribution of the sensor field 
based on these inputs and places the sink node at the center of the field. Examples from 
the MATLAB simulator of the uniform and random distributions of sensor nodes are 
shown in Figure 8. A matrix of neighbor nodes and physical distances, named neigh, is 
created based on the transmission range and the physical locations of the nodes relative to 
each other. This matrix is used to determine which nodes are within the transmission 
range of other nodes in the network. 
 
 Uniform Spacing (Left) with 196 Nodes and Random Distribution Figure 8. 
(Right) with 250 Nodes 
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2. Determining Transmission Order 
Once the nodes are placed and the neighbors are calculated, the simulator 
determines the transmission order and the number of times the nodes attempt to transmit. 
The simulator builds a 2×N matrix called trans_order, where N is the number of 
transmissions and randomly assigns node addresses to each cell in the first row. The node 
in the first cell is given a transmit time of zero, and each following node is given a 
transmit time randomly calculated between zero and 10.0 s following the previous node. 
These values are stored in the second row. This creates the transmission queue for both 
the modified LOADng and LOADng simulations. When the timer for a node reaches 
zero, that node is put into a matrix named pending_txmit with all of the information that 
is contained in the packet. 
3. Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
A basic CSMA/CA algorithm was designed into the simulator and implemented 
in the function CSMA_CA. When a node in pending_txmit has a back-off timer of zero, it 
attempts to transmit. The node first listens to see if a neighbor node is transmitting. The 
simulator determines this by comparing the nodes in the txmitting matrix (containing 
nodes that are currently transmitting) with the neighbor nodes in neigh of the node 
attempting to transmit. If there are no matching nodes, there are no neighbor nodes 
transmitting, and the node is able to transmit. The node is put into the txmitting matrix 
with a transmitting timer set based on the values in Table 2 and is now in a transmitting 
state. If there is at least one neighbor node transmitting, the node goes into a back-off 
equal to the longest remaining transmit time of the transmitting neighbor. When its back-
off timer reaches zero, it attempts to transmit again. 
4. Collision Detection 
The collision function determines if there is a collision due to the hidden node 
problem. If two transmitting nodes that are not neighbors have a common neighbor, there 
is a collision. The simulator determines if there are common neighbors by comparing all 
of the nodes in txmitting and finding common neighbors in the neigh matrix. If two nodes 
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have a common neighbor, both nodes are put back into pending_txmit and are given a 
back-off time based on a Binary Exponential Back-off (BEB) mechanism. 
The BEB value is determined based on the number of times the node has gone 
into a back-off state. The back-off intervals are based on the transmission time for a full 
127-byte frame, which is 4.1 ms. The node randomly chooses an integer value from zero 
to the number of times it has gone into back-off and multiplies that by 4.1 ms. This is the 
node’s back-off timer. After failing to finish a transmission five times, a node quits trying 
to transmit and simply drops the packet. In this case, the simulator removes the node 
from the txmitting matrix. 
5. Packet Transmission 
When the transmit timer for a node in the txmitting matrix reaches zero, the 
tx_complete or tx_complete_mod functions are called for standard LOADng or modified 
LOADng, respectively. These functions first determine the next hop for the packet based 
on the destination and the transmitting node’s routing set. The function flood, flood_mod, 
sink_flood, or unicast is then called based on the type of packet the node is transmitting. 
If it is a unicast packet, the next hop is passed to the unicast function. The values used to 
calculate the metrics for the simulation are initiated and updated in the tx_complete and 
tx_complete_mod functions.  
6. Flooding RREQ Packets 
When a node needs to send a packet to the sink node, it first determines if it has a 
route to the sink node in its routing set. If it does not have a route, it floods a RREQ 
packet to its neighbor nodes. The flooding is accomplished using a classical flooding 
routine. There are three functions that handle packet flooding in the simulator: flood, 
flood_mod, and sink_flood. 
a. Flood 
The flood function handles flooding for the normal LOADng protocol. An 
intermediate node that is not the destination node floods the RREQ to all of its neighbors 
except the neighbor node from which the RREQ was received. This is accomplished by 
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placing these neighbor nodes into the pending_txmit matrix with the same packet 
information and a decremented hop limit. If a node receives a RREQ packet that it has 
already forwarded, it ignores the packet. If a neighbor node is the destination for the 
RREQ, it is placed into the pending_txmit matrix with a packet type of RREP and a 
destination address equal to the source of the RREQ. 
Jitter is introduced into the system by assigning a back-off time between zero and 
three times the transmission time of a data packet. This is known as window jitter and is 
shown by Cordero et al. [21] as a simple, effective way to reduce the number of collisions 
during the flooding of RREQ packets during route discovery. The introduction of jitter in 
the flood routines dramatically reduces the number of collisions due to hidden nodes, 
which increases the success rate of the RREQ process.     
After the neighbor nodes are placed into the pending_txmit matrix, the 
update_route_table function is called. Each neighbor node updates its routing sets if the 
route to the source and neighbor nodes have new routes or have a lower hop count than 
an existing tuple. This creates the reverse route that the RREP takes back to the source. 
b. Flood_mod 
The flood_mod function performs the flooding functions for the modified 
LOADng protocol. It works identically to the flood function discussed previously with a 
few additions. This routine must take into account the sink flag when looking at the 
destination because of the modified RREQ from the sink node. This is to distinguish the 
modified RREQ from any normal RREQ packet that may be destined for a non-sink 
node.   
For the sink node, flood_mod is called the first time the sink node receives a 
RREQ packet from a source node. This simulates the sink node ignoring the packet and 
continuing to flood the packet as if it were not the destination. The flood_mod function is 
not called to handle flooding of modified RREQ packets from the sink node.   
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c. Sink_flood 
The sink_flood function handles the flooding of RREQ packets that were 
modified by the sink node during the route discovery process. It is called when the sink 
node receives a second RREQ from a source node. The sink node first determines all of 
its neighbors that have not forwarded the RREQ and adds itself to the set with a 
probability of 0.5. It then randomly chooses a node from this set to act as the sink node. If 
it chooses itself, the sink node is placed into the pending_txmit matrix for a RREP back to 
the source. If it chooses another node from the set, it alters the RREQ packet with the 
new node as the destination and sets the sink flag to 1. The sink node then floods the 
altered RREQ packet to all of its neighbors that have not forwarded the original RREQ in 
accordance to the rules of classical flooding. This process is critical to achieving k-
anonymity. 
7. Sending Unicast Packets 
When a node wants to transmit a RREP, RREP_ACK, or data packet, this traffic 
is sent via a unicast transmission from the source node to the destination node. The 
sending node sends this packet to one neighbor based on the next hop address in its 
routing set for the destination node. This is handled by the unicast function. The unicast 
function determines whether the receiving node is the destination. If it is not, the 
receiving node is added to pending_txmit and continues to unicast toward the destination. 
If it is the destination, the node reacts based on the type of packet received. If it is a 
RREP packet, the node is first put into pending_txmit for a RREP_ACK packet with a 
back-off time of zero. It is then put into pending_txmit for a data packet with a back-off 
equal to the transmit time for a RREP_ACK to ensure that it sends this packet second. If 
the packet received is a RREP_ACK or a data packet, the receiving node does nothing. 
8. Broadcasting 
During the simulation of the modified LOADng routing protocol, a data packet is 
broadcast when the destination node receives the packet with the sink flag set. In the 
unicast function, if the packet is a data packet with the sink flag set and the next hop node 
is the destination, the next hop is put into pending_txmit with the destination address set 
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to the broadcast address. The node is put into the txmitting matrix through the CSMA_CA 
function. When the transmission timer reaches zero, the tx_complete_mod function calls 
the broadcast function, which signals that the data packet was received by the sink node. 
9. Measuring Metrics 
Five metrics are measured in the simulation: sink-node anonymity, average route 
length, latency, power use, and PDR. 
a. Sink-node Anonymity 
The simulator records the total number of transmissions completed by each node 
as well as the number of RREP packets originated and RREP packets forwarded by each 
node. It separates these between nodes that are neighbors to the sink node and those that 
are not. From these numbers, the mean and standard deviation are calculated for the node 
set including the sink node and its neighbors and then separately for the set of all other 
nodes. This is performed for the standard and modified LOADng protocols separately. 
b. Route Length 
The average route length is calculated at the end of the simulation by finding the 
average of the non-zero route metrics within the total routing set. This is the average 
route length for all routes that were determined during the simulation.   
c. Latency 
Latency is measured from the time a unicast packet is sent to the time it is 
received at its destination. The simulator tracks the total latency for each node in the 
network and divides this by the total number of unicast packets originated by that node. 
The average is then taken across all nodes in the network to obtain the average latency for 
all nodes. 
d. Power Use 
During the simulation, the simulator maintains a running count of the number of 
times each node attempts to transmit, completes a transmission, and the total time each 
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node is transmitting. These values are used with the values in Table 3 and in accordance 
with the description in Section A.3 to determine the total power used by each node in the 
network.   
e. PDR 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) is determined based on the number of unicast 
packets originated and the number of unicast packets received. The simulator maintains a 
total count of the number of unicast transmissions originated by nodes in the network as 
well as the total number of unicast packets received by nodes in the network. Dividing 
the total number received by the total number originated gives the PDR. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided an overview of the simulation environment and the 
design of the simulator in MATLAB. The simulator runs the scenario for the modified 
LOADng protocol followed by the standard LOADng protocol for identical node 
placements, transmit order, and transmit times. Classical flooding was used to transmit 
RREQ packets through the network. CSMA/CA and collision detection were 
implemented to simulate a realistic network environment. Information on network traffic 
was gathered to calculate five metrics: sink-node anonymity, average route length, 
latency, power use, and PDR. 
 38 





V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The simulations were run for a uniform spacing of 196 nodes and a random 
distribution of 250 nodes. Under each scenario, simulations were run using 500, 1000, 
and 2000 transmissions from nodes to the sink node. The transmission order of the nodes 
and the time spacing were randomly generated, as previously noted. 
A. SINK-NODE ANONYMITY 
Achieving sink-node anonymity utilizing a reactive routing protocol is the 
primary goal of this research. We define the sink node as anonymous if the number of 
transmissions sent and the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded for the sink node are 
within one standard deviation of the mean of the same metrics for its neighbors. In this 
section, we present the results of the anonymity test for the modified LOADng protocol 
and compare the results to the standard LOADng protocol. The results presented for each 
number of transmissions in both sections represent the results from the same simulations.  
1. Number of Transmissions 
The number of individual transmissions completed for each node was tracked 
separately during the modified LOADng and LOADng simulations. A completed 
transmission means a single node completes the transmission of one packet to a neighbor 
node. Transmissions that were incomplete due to a collision are not counted in the 
numbers. The transmission number values for 500, 1000, and 2000 transmissions are 
shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. These tables contain the mean and standard 
deviation of the number of transmissions for the sink node’s neighbor nodes and the 
nodes that are not neighbors to the sink node. The numbers for both our modified 




Table 5.   Number of Node Transmissions for 500 Total Transmissions 
 
  Uniform Spacing  Random Distribution 
 
    Neighbors   Neighbors 
 
  Sink Node Sink Non-sink Sink Node Sink Non-sink 
Modified 
LOADng 
Mean 976 969 628.66 1079 1130.67 856.06 
Std-dev   39.29 41.79   121.1409 111.46 
LOADng 
Mean 592 315.43 115.89 682 357.33 192.25 
Std-dev   146.35 37.83   189.38 53.69 
 
Table 6.   Number of Node Transmissions for 1000 Total Transmissions 
 
  Uniform Spacing  Random Distribution 
 
    Neighbors   Neighbors 
 
  Sink Node Sink Non-sink Sink Node Sink Non-sink 
Modified 
LOADng 
Mean 1267 1261 678.18 1519 1694.60 1261.65 
Std-dev   74.03 69.56   160.24 83.43 
LOADng 
Mean 1084 515 130.81 1230 518.30 234.88 
Std-dev   292.78 76.19   371.71 70.72 
 
Table 7.   Number of Node Transmissions for 2000 Total Transmissions 
 
  Uniform Spacing  Random Distribution 
 
    Neighbors   Neighbors 
 
  Sink Node Sink Non-sink Sink Node Sink Non-sink 
Modified 
LOADng 
Mean 2100 1924 839.15 1861 2016.50 977.88 
Std-dev   297.52 127.46   298.4598 661.39 
LOADng 
Mean 2186 938.00 185.45 2225 1103.11 279.40 
Std-dev   584.55 136.47   179.33 162.12 
 
For the modified LOADng protocol, the sink node was within one standard 
deviation of the mean number of transmissions for its neighbor nodes for all cases tested. 
The uniform node spacing consistently achieved anonymity for the number of 
transmissions based on our criteria. The random node distribution met the criteria in most 
cases but failed under certain circumstances. These circumstances are explained later in 
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this chapter. The number of sink-node transmissions in the standard LOADng protocol 
was never within one standard deviation of the mean number of transmissions for its 
neighbor nodes.   
There was a significant increase in traffic among all nodes in the modified 
LOADng simulation compared to the standard LOADng protocol. This is partially due to 
the extra RREQ packets sent during the initial route discovery process to give the sink 
node awareness of its neighbor’s routes to the source. It was also found during simulation 
that fewer RREQs were sent during the standard LOADng simulation than initially 
expected. This is due to the forward route generation during the RREP process, which 
generates routes to the sink node for the intermediate nodes. When these intermediate 
nodes send data to the sink node for the first time, they already have a route and do not 
need to send a RREQ. In the modified LOADng protocol, these routes to the sink node 
are built only when the sink node has chosen itself, which is a much smaller number of 
times. The comparison of the total transmissions between our modified LOADng 
protocol and the standard LOADng protocol is shown in Figure 9.   
 
 Modified LOADng and Standard LOADng Total Transmissions Figure 9. 























500 Transmissions 1000 Transmissions 2000 Transmissions
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2. RREP to RREQ Ratio 
Sink-node anonymity was achieved for the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs 
forwarded as well. The results shown in Table 8 are from the same simulations as those 
in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for the respective number of transmissions. This demonstrates that 
the modified LOADng protocol meets our criteria for sink-node anonymity for both the 
number of transmissions and the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded 
simultaneously. The standard LOADng protocol is not shown because only the sink node 
sent RREPs in that scenario, meaning the ratio for all other nodes is zero.  
Table 8.   RREPs Sent to RREQs Forwarded Ratio 
  Uniform Spacing Random Distribution 
Transmissions Sink node Avg Std-dev Sink node Avg Std-dev 
500 0.0647482 0.070986 0.010574 0.072289 0.059148 0.013748 
1000 0.0831974 0.072779 0.013318 0.044426 0.05115 0.011477 
2000 0.0861582 0.072693 0.016489 0.087585 0.076675 0.013895 
 
B. NON-ANONYMITY PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The results presented in this section represent the metrics not directly related to 
sink-node anonymity. All measurements were performed during the same simulations as 
presented in the previous section. 
1. Power Usage 
The higher network traffic directly correlates to higher power usage, as shown in 
Table 9. The mean ratio of power usage between the two protocols is 4.48:1, 
demonstrating a dramatic increase in power usage. The main cause of the increase in 
power is the additional flooding of RREQ packets for route discovery. There is also a 
significant increase in collisions as depicted in Figure 10 for a simulation with 2000 
transmissions. These collisions cause nodes to retransmit their packets, resulting in an 
increase in power usage.   
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To determine the effect of collisions on total power use, additional simulations 
were performed with collisions disabled. The result was a mean ratio of power usage of 
3.36:1, down from 4.48:1. This shows that there is significant impact caused by the 
increase in collisions. Nevertheless, even this lower ratio represents a large increase in 
power usage over the standard LOADng protocol. From the Ratio row in Table 9, we see 
that the ratio for power usage decreases as the simulations get longer (i.e., more 
transmissions). In longer simulations, the RREQs are a lower proportion of the total 
transmissions, resulting in fewer collisions proportional to time. As the simulation 
progresses, there are fewer RREQs and, correspondingly, fewer collisions, thereby 
decreasing average power usage. Both the modified LOADng and standard LOADng had 
zero collisions during times without RREQs.   
Table 9.   Average Power Use per Node (mWh) 
  Uniform Spacing Random Distribution 
Transmissions 500 1000 2000 500 1000 2000 
Mod. LOADng 0.5238041 0.602645 0.691146 0.523804 1.198195 1.038033 
LOADng 0.1004773 0.140199 0.186704 0.100477 0.225695 0.267513 
Ratio 5.21316 4.2985 3.70184 5.21316 5.308916 3.880316 
 



















The average latency of unicast packets between the source node and the sink node 
increased in the modified LOADng protocol by 5.0 ms, as is shown in Table 10. This is 
mainly due to the broadcast of packets, which add an extra 4.1 ms to the total latency. 
The number of hops to the chosen neighbor node also averages out to be slightly longer 
than to the sink node itself. This is the likely cause for the additional 1.0 ms in latency.  
The average path length of all established routes is 0.83 hops fewer for the 
modified LOADng protocol, as shown in Table 11. This is due to the increased number 
of RREQ packets allowing the nodes more opportunity to form shorter routes. 
Table 10.   Latency of Unicast Packets between Source Node 
and Sink Node (sec) 
  Uniform Spacing Random Distribution 
Transmissions 500 1000 2000 500 1000 2000 
Mod. LOADng 0.028694 0.024974 0.023346 0.028694 0.025767 0.022405 
LOADng 0.0229192 0.020159 0.018787 0.022919 0.019655 0.018596 
Delta 0.0057748 0.004815 0.004559 0.005775 0.006112 0.003809 
 
Table 11.   Average Path Length Measure in Hops between All Nodes 
  Uniform Spacing Random Distribution 
Transmissions 500 1000 2000 500 1000 2000 
Mod. LOADng 10.344919 10.48034 10.36545 10.32775 9.137914 9.414233 
LOADng 10.804386 11.41985 11.04272 11.73658 9.779416 10.30082 
 
3. PDR 
The PDR for modified LOADng is moderately lower than standard LOADng, 
resulting in an average of -0.0225 and -0.0362 compared to standard LOADng in the 
uniform spacing and random distributions, respectively. These results are shown in Table 
12. This is caused by the increase in collisions as our tests without collisions showed a 
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PDR of 1.0 for both, as expected. In addition, the increased node density of the random 
distribution caused more collisions and a corresponding lower PDR for both protocols. 
Table 12.   Packet Delivery Ratio 
 
Uniform Distribution Random Distribution 
Transmissions 500 1000 2000 500 1000 2000 
Mod. LOADng 0.94291 0.96189 0.967798 0.928807 0.880139 0.957223 
LOADng 0.962 0.984715 0.993474 0.969099 0.935319 0.970252 
Delta -0.01908 -0.02283 -0.02568 -0.04029 -0.05518 -0.01303 
 
C. FAILURE CASES 
There were cases in the random distribution in which the modified LOADng 
protocol failed to achieve sink-node anonymity. An example of the node placement in a 
normal failure scenario is shown in Figure 11. When a RREQ comes through the lone 
bottom node (shown as the bottom red arrow in Figure 11) to the sink node (shown as a 
star in Figure 11), that lone node is excluded from the candidate node set. This makes the 
three nodes above the sink node (three red arrows above sink node in Figure 11) and the 
sink node the only candidate nodes. Also, in this scenario, there are no routes between the 
three neighbor nodes (above the sink node) to nodes below the sink node that are shorter 
than the route that goes through the sink node. This forces all traffic to and from nodes 
below the sink node to go through the sink node, causing the total transmissions at the 
sink node to be higher than its neighbor nodes.  
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 Random Distribution that Fails to Achieve Sink Node Anonymity Figure 11. 
with Arrows Highlighting Sink Neighbor Nodes  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We achieved sink-node anonymity based on the total transmissions and the 
RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded ratio using a modified LOADng protocol in both 
uniform spacing and random node distribution. There are sacrifices to power usage, 
latency, and PDR to achieve anonymity using this approach. The increase in total power 
consumption is the most dramatic drawback to this approach to anonymity, with an 
average power ratio of 4.48:1 between the two protocols. There were a small number of 
cases in the random distribution in which sink-node anonymity was not achieved due to 
the location of the sink node’s neighbors. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
WSNs have been a vital asset for the military for many decades and continue to 
increase in capabilities and applications. Current sensors employed by the USMC are 
bulky and complicated to deploy. There are small and inexpensive COTS devices that can 
fulfill the need for easily deployable wireless sensors. This thesis research was motivated 
by a desire to enable sink-node anonymity on these computationally restricted devices 
with minimal change to the standard communication protocol for the sensor nodes. The 
existing research in sink-node anonymity, such as location-aided routing, extra layers of 
encryption, or complex routing schemes, add increased computational complexity to the 
network and require all nodes to have a broader understanding of the network. 
LOADng is designed to be lightweight and requires low processing resources at 
the nodes. Our modified LOADng method achieves sink-node anonymity while 
preserving the lightweight nature of LOADng for the standard sensor nodes in the 
network. The majority of the additional computational overhead is assigned to the sink 
node, which is assumed to have more resources to accomplish the computations. The 
only additional requirement of the normal sensor nodes is being aware of the sink flag for 
the purpose of acting as the sink node. 
 Our modified LOADng routing protocol was simulated in MATLAB and 
compared to the standard LOADng routing protocol. From our simulations, we were able 
to show that sink-node anonymity was achieved in most network topologies except for a 
specific case in which the sink-node transmission number exceeded one standard 
deviation above the mean of that of its neighbors. This only happened when there was a 
single sink-node neighbor on one side of the sink node and multiple neighbors on the 
other, forcing traffic through the sink node.   
The main tradeoff with our method to achieve sink-node anonymity is the 
increased power usage due to the extra transmissions per node and extra collisions. There 
are always tradeoffs to achieve anonymity. We showed in our results that as the number 
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of transmissions increased (i.e., longer simulations), the average power consumption 
decreased. This is because the RREQs are a lower proportion of the total transmissions, 
resulting in fewer collisions proportional to time.   
Overall, despite the short-term tradeoffs in power, the modified LOADng routing 
scheme achieved sink node anonymity for the majority of cases, adding a level of 
cybersecurity that is not found in the standard LOADng protocol.  
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
Our goal was to develop a sink-node anonymity protocol using a reactive routing 
protocol that would function on IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor nodes with highly 
constrained computational resources. In this thesis research, we have contributed the 
following to the study of sink-node anonymity:  
 Development of a modified LOADng routing protocol, which provides k-
anonymity to the sink node while limiting the computational overhead for 
the sensor nodes. 
 Simulation of the modified routing algorithm to measure and quantify 
anonymity and performance versus the standard LOADng protocol. 
 Measurement of the performance of the modified routing algorithm 
compared to the standard LOADng protocol for average route length, 
latency, power consumption, and PDR. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
While we successfully achieved sink-node anonymity, there are potential 
refinements to the protocol to improve the anonymity results and reduce the negative 
impact on some of the performance metrics. 
1. Intelligent Neighbor Selection 
Despite distributing the sink node role among the sink node’s neighbors, there is 
still sometimes a large standard deviation within the set of k nodes. This shows that the 
distribution between the nodes in the set is not consistent due to their being chosen 
randomly. If the sink node tracked the choice of nodes, it could more effectively 
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distribute the choice evenly among the nodes. This would narrow the standard deviation 
and make the set of k nodes more indistinguishable from one another.    
2. Optimized Flooding  
Collisions due to flooding are a major cause of increased energy usage and packet 
drop in the modified LOADng protocol. We utilized classical flooding in our simulation, 
which is not as efficient as many optimized flooding schemes. A more optimized 
flooding routine can be developed to lower the overall traffic in the network, thereby 
reducing the power consumption and collisions. This routine must be carefully designed 
to ensure that it does not sacrifice anonymity for efficiency. Additionally, more research 
can be done on the optimal jitter and BEB schemes to further reduce collisions during the 
flooding of RREQs. 
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APPENDIX. SIMULATOR CODE 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Main.m 
% Sink node anonymity of a wireless sensor network using LOADng 
reactive 
% routing protocol. 
% 
% Major Haakensen, Thomas J. 
% Student, M.S. Electrical and Computer Engineering 






%Declare global variables 
global timer; 
global time_inc; 
global route_table_sink;    %Sink node routing table 
global route_table;     %Non-sink nodes routing tables 
global pending_txmit;   %[node, source, dest, type, hop_limit, seq_no, 
backoff, backoff_num, sink_flag] 
global txmitting;       %[node, source, dest, type, hop_limit, seq_no, 
txmit_time, sink_flag] 
global pending_response; %Stores nodes waiting for a response to a 
packet 
global txmit_times;     %Stores transmit times for different packets 
global neigh;           %Stores neighbor nodes and distances 
global time_out; 
global RREQ_fwd;   %Tracks nodes that sent/forwarded RREQ. Used in 
flooding 
global seq_nos; 
global sink_RREQ;   %Tracks the times the sink received RREQ from each 
node 
global success; 
global trans_num;   %Tracks the number of transmissions for each node 
global trans_num_comp;  %Tracks the number of completed transmissions 
for each node 
global run; 
global node_latency;    %Track latency of transmission for nodes 
global latency;     %Tracks total latency 







Data_rate = 250000;     %250kbps. Max rate for IEEE 802.15.4 
run = 0; 
route_len = [0 0];      %Stores average route lengths 
N = input(‘How many nodes?: ‘); 
 52 
field_size = input(‘What is the field size?: ‘); 
Range = input(‘What is the transmission range?: ‘);  % Transmission 
range in m 
Num_tx = input(‘How many transmissions?: ‘); 
distro = input(‘Enter (1) for uniform, (2) for random distribution: ‘); 
  
disp(‘Deploying nodes’); 
if distro == 1 
    x = floor(sqrt(N)); 
    spacing = field_size/x; 
    for i = 1:x 
        nodes(i*x - x+1:i*x, 1) = i * spacing - spacing; 
        nodes(i*x - x+1:i*x, 2) = linspace(0, x*spacing, x); 
    end   
elseif distro == 2 
    nodes = field_size*rand(N, 2);    %Randomly generate node locations 
end 
nodes(1, 1:2) = field_size/2;       %Puts sink node in center of field 
scatter(nodes(2:N, 1), nodes(2:N, 2));  %Display node locations 
hold; 
scatter(nodes(1, 1), nodes(1, 2), ‘p’); 
grid; 
  
trans_order(1, :) = randi(N-1, 1, Num_tx); 
trans_order(1, :) = trans_order(1, :) + 1;    %Increments all by 1 to 
exclude the sink node 
trans_order(2, 1) = 0; 
for i = 2:length(trans_order)   %Generate times nodes will try to send 
    trans_order(2, i) = trans_order(2, i-1) + rand*10; %10 
end 
sim_time = trans_order(2, Num_tx);  %Time of last transmission 
%trans_order(1, length(trans_order)) = 2; 
trans_order_bak = trans_order;  %Save original trans_order for second 
run 
  
%Times assume 6LowPAN header (25 B) + encryption overhead (21 B) + 
LOADng header 
%127 byte packet takes 4.064 msec at 250 kbps 
t_RREQ = 608/Data_rate;  %time to transmit RREQ (76 bytes) 
t_RREP = 640/Data_rate;  %time to transmit RREP (80 bytes) 
t_Data = 1016/Data_rate; %Full 127 byte data packet 
t_RREP_ACK = 512/Data_rate; %time to transmit RREP_ACK (64 bytes) 
t_RERR = 608/Data_rate;  %time to transmit RRER (76 bytes) 
t_ACK = 512/Data_rate; %time to transmit ACK (64 bytes) 
  
%Times to transmit packets. Index corresponds to type # in txmitting 
txmit_times = [t_RREQ, t_RREP, t_Data, t_RREP_ACK, t_RERR, t_ACK]; 
seq_nos = randi(65536, 1, N); %Generate random 16-bit initial seq_nos 
for nodes 
seq_nos_bak = seq_nos;  %Save original seq_nos for second run 
tx_times = zeros(2, N); %Stores the time each node has been 
transmitting 
trans_num = zeros(2, N);%Stores total number of transmissions for each 
node 
trans_num_comp = zeros(2, N); 
 53 
trans_tries = zeros(2, N); 
retries = zeros(1, N); 
latency = [0 0; 0 0]; 
trans_tot = [0 0; 0 0]; 
collisions = zeros(2, 11); 
out_RREP_ratio = zeros(4, N); 
  
while run < 2  %Loop limits to two runs 
     
route_table = zeros(3, N, N); 
route_table_sink = zeros(N, N); 
RREQ_fwd = zeros(N, N+2); 
neigh = zeros(N,N); 
sink_RREQ = zeros(1, N); 
success = zeros(1, N); 
node_latency = zeros(1, N); 
time_inc = 0.0001; %Time increment (0.0001 = 100 usec) 
timer = 0;  %Initialize global timer 
time_out = 2; 
tx_fin = []; 
  
build_neigh_assoc(N, Range, nodes);   % Build layer-2 neighbor 
associations 
  
fprintf(‘Beginning simulation run %d;\n’, run); 
  
while ~isempty(trans_order) || ~isempty(pending_txmit) || 
~isempty(txmitting) || ~isempty(pending_response) 
    %Main simulation loop. Will run for modified then normal routing. 
    %Add trans_order nodes with times <= 0 to pending_txmit 
    while ~isempty(trans_order) && trans_order(2, 1) <= 0    %While the 
first node has transmit time <= 0         
        pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [trans_order(1, 1), 
trans_order(1, 1), 1, 3, 256, seq_nos(trans_order(1)), 0, 0, 0]]; 
        sink_flag = find(route_table(3, :, 
pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), 1)));         
        if run == 0 && ~isempty(sink_flag) %If first run and there is 
route to sink 
            pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), [3 9]) = [sink_flag 
1]; %Dest is node with sink flag 
        elseif run == 0 
            pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), 4) = 1; %Type is RREQ 
            %fprintf(‘%f: RREQ sent, node: %d;\n’, timer, 
pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), 1)); 
        end 
        if run == 1 && route_table(1, pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 
1), 3), pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), 1)) == 0 
        %If second run and no route to sink 
            pending_txmit(size(pending_txmit, 1), 4) = 1; %Type is RREQ 
        end 
        seq_nos(trans_order(1)) = seq_nos(trans_order(1))+1; 
        trans_order(:, 1) = []; %Clear first column of trans_order         
    end 
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    if ~isempty(txmitting) 
        tx_fin = find(txmitting(:, 7) <= 0);    %Get indices of nodes 
finished transmitting 
    end 
     
    if ~isempty(tx_fin)   %If there are nodes finished transmitting  
        if run == 0     %If first run 
            tx_complete_mod(tx_fin);    %Modified routing 
        elseif run == 1    %If second run 
            tx_complete(tx_fin);    %Normal LOADng routing 
        end 
        tx_fin = [];    %Clear tx_fin 
    end 
     
    if (~isempty(find(pending_txmit(:, 7) <= 0))) 
        CSMA_CA();  %Checks if the “pending_txmit” nodes can transmit 
    end 
     
    if size(txmitting, 1) >= 2  %If there are at least 2 transmitting 
nodes 
        collision(txmitting(:, 1), neigh);    %Check to see if there is 
a collision    
    end 
     
    %Locate expired timers in pending_response 
    if ~isempty(pending_response) && ~isempty(find(pending_response(:, 
4) <= 0)) 
        pend_resp_exp = find(pending_response(:, 4) <= 0); 
        if ~isempty(pend_resp_exp) 
            for i = 1:length(pend_resp_exp)               
                pr = pending_response(pend_resp_exp(i), :); 
                if pr(5) >= 4   %Tried more than 4 times 
                    fprintf(‘%f: Transmission failure, node: %d, type: 
%d, dest: %d;\n’, timer, pr(1), pr(3), pr(2));                 
                else            %Tried <= 5 times 
                    sf = route_table(3, pr(2), pr(1));  %Sink flag 
                    pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [pr(1), pr(1), 
pr(2), pr(3), 256, seq_nos(pr(1)), 0, pr(5)+1, sf]]; 
                    fprintf(‘%f: Retransmission, node: %d, type: %d, 
dest: %d, attempt: %d;\n’, timer, pr(1), pr(3), pr(2), pr(5)+1); 
                end 
                if pending_response(pend_resp_exp(i), 3) == 1 
                    RREQ_fwd(pending_response(pend_resp_exp(i), 1), :) 
= 0; 
                end 
            end 
            pending_response(pend_resp_exp, :) = []; 
        end 
    end 
        
    %Adjust timers by time_inc 
    timer = timer + time_inc; 
    pending_txmit(:, 7) = pending_txmit(:, 7) - time_inc;   %Backoff - 
time_inc 
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    txmitting(:, 7) = txmitting(:, 7) - time_inc;   %t_tx - time_inc 
    trans_order(2, :) = trans_order(2, :) - time_inc; 
    node_latency(:) = node_latency(:) + time_inc; 
    if ~isempty(pending_response)     %If pending_response not empty 
        pending_response(:, 4) = pending_response(:, 4) - time_inc; 
%Decrement pending timeouts 
    end 
    RREQ_fwd(:, 2) = RREQ_fwd(:, 2) - time_inc;  
     
    %Track the times that the nodes have been transmitting  
    tx_ind = txmitting(:, 1); 









run = run + 1; 
route_len(run) = mean(mean(nonzeros(route_table(2, :, :)))); 
trans_order = trans_order_bak;  %Restore trans_order for second run 




sink_nbrs = neigh(1, 1:2:size(neigh, 2)); 
sink_nbrs = sink_nbrs(sink_nbrs>0); 
not_sink_nbrs = linspace(1, N, N); 
temp = ~ismember(not_sink_nbrs, sink_nbrs); 
not_sink_nbrs = not_sink_nbrs .* temp; 
not_sink_nbrs = not_sink_nbrs(not_sink_nbrs>0); 
out_sink_trans_num = trans_num_comp(:, sink_nbrs); 
out_node_trans_num = trans_num_comp(:, not_sink_nbrs); 
  
%Measure power usage (mWh) 
out_power = tx_times * (0.0000008 / 0.0000032); 
out_power = out_power + (0.000006 * trans_num); 
out_power = out_power + (trans_tries * 0.00004766); 
  
%% Get node distances from sink 
node_dist = zeros(N,2); 
trans_hist = zeros(2,N); 
trans_hist_sink = zeros(2,N); 
for i = 1:N 
    node_dist(i, 1) = i; 
    node_dist(i, 2) = sqrt((nodes(1,1)-nodes(i,1))^2 + (nodes(1,2)-
nodes(i,2))^2); 
end 
node_dist = sortrows(node_dist, 2); 
  
trans_hist_sink(1, N/2) = trans_num_comp(1, 1); 
trans_hist_sink(2, N/2) = trans_num_comp(2, 1); 
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for i = 1:N/2-1 
    trans_hist(1, N/2-i) = trans_num_comp(1, node_dist(2*i, 1)); 
    trans_hist(1, N/2+i) = trans_num_comp(1, node_dist(2*i+1, 1)); 
    trans_hist(2, N/2-i) = trans_num_comp(2, node_dist(2*i, 1)); 














function build_neigh_assoc(N, Range, nodes) 
%This function builds the neigh matrix, which is a 2D array which 
%contains the neighbors and distance of all nodes within transmit range 
of 




fprintf(‘Building node neighbor associations\n’); 
for i = 1:N     %i is address of node 
    ind = 1; 
    for j = 1:N     %j is address of neighbor 
        D = Range + 1;  %Initial condition: D > Range 
        if i~=j     %Prevents node being compared to self 
            %Compute distance from node i to node j 
            D = sqrt((nodes(i,1)-nodes(j,1))^2 + (nodes(i,2)-
nodes(j,2))^2); 
        end 
        if D <= Range   %Create neighbor array.  
            neigh(i, ind) = j; 
            neigh(i, ind+1) = D; 
            ind = ind + 2; 
        end 
    end 
end 





%This function checks all of the nodes in the “pending_txmit” matrix.   
%If the node has a backoff timer <= 0, and there are no other neighbor  
%nodes transmitting, the node is moved to the “txmitting” matrix with  
%tx_time equal to the transmit time for the type of packet.   
%If one or more neighbor nodes are transmitting, the “pending_txmit”  
%node’s backoff is set to the highest tx_time for the transmitting  
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ind = 1; 
while (size(pending_txmit, 1) >= ind) %While ind <= to size of 
pending_txmit 
     
    if pending_txmit(ind, 7) > 0 %If node is in backoff 
        ind = ind + 1; 
        continue; 
    end 
    trans_tries(run+1, pending_txmit(ind, 1)) = trans_tries(run+1, 
pending_txmit(ind, 1)) + 1; 
    tx_temp = 0; 
    idle = 1;       %Medium idle flag initially set to 1 
    neigh_temp = neigh(pending_txmit(ind, 1), 1:2:size(neigh, 2));   
%Get neighbor addresses 
     
    if ~isempty(txmitting) && ismember(pending_txmit(ind, 1), 
txmitting(:, 1))      
    %If the node is already transmitting    
        x = find(txmitting(:, 1) == pending_txmit(ind, 1)); 
        %Set backoff = to the current transmit time 
        pending_txmit(ind, 7) = txmitting(x, 7); 
        ind = ind + 1; 
        continue;   %Go to next loop iteration 
    end 
  
    if ~isempty(txmitting)    %If txmitting is not empty 
        tx_temp = ismember(txmitting(:, 1), neigh_temp);  %Find 
transmitting nodes that are neighbors 
    end 
     
    if sum(tx_temp) > 0 %If there are transmitting nodes in range 
        idle = 0;       %Set idle flag to 0 
        tx_times_temp = tx_temp .* txmitting(:, 7);  %Array of transmit 
times for neighbor nodes 
        pending_txmit(ind, 7) = max(tx_times_temp);  %Set backoff to 
largest transmit time 
    end 
     
    if (idle && (pending_txmit(ind, 7) <= 0))   %Medium is idle && 
backoff <= 0  
        trans_num(run+1, pending_txmit(ind, 1)) = trans_num(run+1, 
pending_txmit(ind, 1))+1;    %Track transmission 
        txmitting(size(txmitting, 1)+1, [1:6, 8:9]) = 
pending_txmit(ind, [1:6, 8:9]);  %Move to txmitting queue 
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        txmitting(end, 7) = txmit_times(pending_txmit(ind, 4)); %Set 
transmit time based on type size(txmitting, 1) 
        pending_txmit(ind, :) = [];    %Erase from pending_xmit 
    else        %Medium not idle or backoff >= 0 
        ind = ind + 1;  %Increment “ind” here and not if idle 





function collision(txmt_nodes, nbrs) 
%This function tests to see if there is a collision due to the hidden-
node 
%problem. It checks if any of the transmitting nodes have common 
%neighbors. If they do, the common neighbor signals a collision and all 










BEB = [0 0.0041 0.0082 0.0143 0.0184 0.0225];  
nbr_coll = []; 
nbrs = nbrs(:, 1:2:size(nbrs, 2));  %Clear ranges 
coll_ind = ceil(timer/(sim_time/10)); 
  
for i = 1:length(txmt_nodes) 
    for j = i+1:length(txmt_nodes) 
        node1 = nbrs(txmt_nodes(i), :); 
        node1 = node1(node1 ~= 0); 
        node2 = nbrs(txmt_nodes(j), :); 
        node2 = node2(node2 ~= 0); 
        memb_test = ismember(node1, node2); %Check for common neighbors 
        if sum(memb_test)  %If there are shared neighbors 
            coll_nodes = memb_test .* node1;      %Get node(s) where 
collision occurred 
            coll_nodes = coll_nodes(coll_nodes ~= 0);  %Clear zeros 
            for k = 1:length(coll_nodes)                
                fprintf(‘%f: Collision, node: %d;\n’, timer, 
coll_nodes(k)); 
                %Get index(es)in txmt_nodes of transmitting neighbor 
nodes 
                nbr_tx_nodes = find(ismember(txmt_nodes, 
nbrs(coll_nodes(k), :))); 
                new_node = ~ismember(nbr_tx_nodes, nbr_coll); %Find 
node index(es) not already in nbr_coll 
                new_node = new_node .* nbr_tx_nodes;     
                new_node = new_node(new_node ~= 0);      %Clear zeros 
                collisions(run+1, coll_ind) = collisions(run+1, 
coll_ind) + 1; 
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                if new_node     
                    %Add new_node nodes to nbr_coll 
                    nbr_coll = vertcat(nbr_coll, new_node); %Index of 
txmitting nodes who had collisions 
                end    
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
for m =1:length(nbr_coll) %For all transmitting neighbor nodes  
    %Move transmitting neighbors to pending_txmit 
    retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 1)) = retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 
1)) + 1; 
    backoff = BEB(randi(retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 1)) + 1)); 
    %backoff = (0.0082*rand + 0.0041)*retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 
1)); 
    %Alternate backoff algorithm 
    if retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 1)) < 5 
        pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 1:6), 
backoff, txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 8:9)]]; 
    else 
        retries(txmitting(nbr_coll(m), 1)) = 0; 
        disp(‘collision failure’); %Track failure due to collisions 
    end 
end 





%This function is called when nodes have completed transmitting in 
normal  
%LOADng, i.e., when their transmit timers reached 0. It processes the 
packet  
%according to the node that is receiveing.  ‘tx_fin’ holds the 
index(es) of   












for i = 1:length(tx_fin) 
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 1 %If type == RREQ 
        %Count RREQs forwarded 
        out_RREP_ratio(4, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) = 
out_RREP_ratio(4, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) + 1; 
    end 
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    trans_num_comp(2, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) = trans_num_comp(2, 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) + 1; 
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2) && 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) > 1 
    %If txmitting node is source and the type ~= RREQ 
        %Start measuring latency 
        node_latency(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) = 0;  %Reset the latency 
time for node 
        if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 2 %If type == RREP 
            %Count RREPs initiated 
            out_RREP_ratio(3, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) = 
out_RREP_ratio(3, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) + 1; 
        end 
    end 
    txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) = txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) - 1; %Dec hop 
limit     
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2) && 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) <= 3 
    %If txmitting node is source and the type == RREQ, RREP, or Data 
        %Put into pending response array 
        if ~isempty(pending_response) 
            pr_ind = find(pending_response(:, 1) == 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)); 
            if isempty(pr_ind) || ~ismember(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), 
pending_response(pr_ind, 2)) 
            %If node not already in pending_response for this 
transmission 
                pending_response = [pending_response; 
[txmitting(tx_fin(i), [1, 3, 4]), time_out, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 8)]];   
            end 
        else 
            pending_response = [txmitting(tx_fin(i), [1, 3, 4]), 
time_out, txmitting(tx_fin(i),8)]; 
        end 
    end 
     
    %Get next hop 
    if (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == 1) && (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3) ~= 1)      
    %If sink node, choose lowest metric 
        route_list = route_table_sink(:, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3)); 
        next_hop = find(route_list);    %Get non-zero element indexes 
        if ~isempty(next_hop) 
            next_hop = find(route_list == min(route_list(next_hop))); 
%Get lowest non-zero metric index 
            if length(next_hop) > 1 
                next_hop = next_hop(randi(length(next_hop))); %In case 
of multiple with same metric, randomly choose one 
            end 
        end 
    else    %Not the sink node 
        next_hop = route_table(1, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)); 
    end 
     
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 1     %Type is RREQ 
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        flood(txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
    else    %Type is RREP, data, RREP_ACK, RERR, or ACK 
        unicast(next_hop, txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
        if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == 1 && txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 2 
        %If this is sink node and RREP 
            ind = find(RREQ_fwd(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), :) == 0, 1);   
%Index of first zero in row 
            RREQ_fwd(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), ind) = 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1); 
        end 
    end 
end 





%This function is called when nodes have completed transmitting in 
modified  
%LOADng, i.e., when their transmit timers reached 0. It processes the 
packet  
%according to the node that is receiveing.  ‘tx_fin’ holds the 
index(es) of  




global route_table_sink;  
global pending_response; 
global time_out; 






for i = 1:length(tx_fin) 
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 1 %If type == RREQ 
        %Count RREQs forwarded 
        out_RREP_ratio(2, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) = 
out_RREP_ratio(2, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) + 1; 
    end 
    trans_num_comp(1, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) = trans_num_comp(1, 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) + 1; 
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2) && 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) > 1 
    %If txmitting node is source and the type ~= RREQ 
        %Start measuring latency 
        node_latency(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)) = 0;  %Reset the latency 
time for node 
        if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 2 %If type == RREP 
            %Count RREPs initiated 
            out_RREP_ratio(1, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) = 
out_RREP_ratio(1, (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1))) + 1; 
        end 
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    end 
    txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) = txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) - 1; %Dec hop 
limit     
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2) && ... 
            txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) <= 3 && txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3) ~= 
65535 
    %If txmitting node is source && type == RREQ, RREP, or Data && not 
    %broadcast 
        %Put into pending response array 
        if ~isempty(pending_response) 
            pr_ind = find(pending_response(:, 1) == 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)); 
            if isempty(pr_ind) || ~ismember(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), 
pending_response(pr_ind, 2)) 
            %If node not already in pending_response for this 
transmission 
                pending_response = [pending_response; 
[txmitting(tx_fin(i), [1, 3, 4]), time_out, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 8)]];   
            end 
        else 
            pending_response = [txmitting(tx_fin(i), [1, 3, 4]), 
time_out, txmitting(tx_fin(i),8)]; 
        end 
    end 
     
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3) == 65535 %If dest is broadcast address 
        broadcast(txmitting(tx_fin(i), :)); 
        continue;  %Go to next loop iteration 
    end 
     
    %Get next hop 
    if (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == 1) && (txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3) ~= 1)      
    %If sink node, choose lowest metric 
        route_list = route_table_sink(:, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3)); 
        next_hop = find(route_list);    %Get non-zero element indexes 
        if ~isempty(next_hop) 
            next_hop = find(route_list == min(route_list(next_hop))); 
%Get lowest non-zero metric index 
            if length(next_hop) > 1 
                next_hop = next_hop(randi(length(next_hop))); %In case 
of multiple with same metric, randomly choose one 
            end 
        end 
    else    %Not the sink node 
        next_hop = route_table(1, txmitting(tx_fin(i), 3), 
txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1)); 
    end 
     
    if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 4) == 1     %Type is RREQ 
        if txmitting(tx_fin(i), 1) == 1 %If txmitting node is sink node 
            %Dec hop limit to make return route metric through sink 
higher. 
            txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) = txmitting(tx_fin(i), 5) - 2; 
            if sink_RREQ(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2)) == 1 
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                %If this is not the first RREQ received from this 
source node 
                sink_flood(txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
                sink_RREQ(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2)) = 2;  %Prevent 
another RREP to this node 
            else 
                %Flood packet pretending not to be the sink 
                flood_mod(txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
                sink_RREQ(txmitting(tx_fin(i), 2)) = 1; 
            end            
        else    %Txmitting node not the sink node 
            flood_mod(txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
        end 
    else    %Type is RREP, data, RREP_ACK, RERR, or ACK 
        unicast(next_hop, txmitting(tx_fin(i), :), tx_fin(i)); 
    end 
end  




function flood(RREQ_pkt, fin_add) 
%This function is called upon a node’s completion of transmitting a 
RREQ 
%packet. It finds its neighbor nodes that have not forwarded it this  
%particular RREQ packet and adds them to pending_txmit (type = RREQ).  
%It is passed the row from ‘txmitting’ of the node which has completed 
%transmitting and the row index. Standard LOADng. 
  








if RREQ_pkt(1) == RREQ_pkt(2)   %If node is the source 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 1:3) = [RREQ_pkt(6) time_out RREQ_pkt(1)]; 
%Add this RREQ to ‘RREQ_fwd’ 
end 
  
if RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 2) <=0    %If timeout exceeded 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) = 0;  %Clear RREQ_fwd for this RREQ 
    %Find all pending_txmit nodes for this RREQ (same seq num) 
    RREQ_exp = find(pending_txmit(:, 6) == RREQ_pkt(6)); 
    %Clear all pending_txmit nodes for this RREQ 
    pending_txmit(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
    txmitting(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
    return;     %Exit the function 
end 
  
%Add tx_complete node to RREQ_fwd    
 64 
ind = find(RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) == 0, 1);   %Index of first zero in 
row 
RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), ind) = RREQ_pkt(1); 
  
%Find all neighbors not in RREQ_fwd 
neigh_temp = neigh(RREQ_pkt(1), 1:2:size(neigh, 2));   %Get neighbor 
addresses 
%Find neighbor nodes that haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = ~ismember(neigh_temp, RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 
3:size(RREQ_fwd, 2)));   
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh .* neigh_temp;  %Only choose neighbors that 
haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh(RREQ_neigh ~= 0); %Clear zero elements 
  
if ~isempty(RREQ_neigh) 
    delay = 0; 
    for i = 1:length(RREQ_neigh)    %Neighbor nodes to pending_trans 
(type = RREQ) 
        if ~ismember(RREQ_neigh(i), pending_txmit(:, 1)) 
        %If the neighbor node is not already in pending_txmit for this 
RREQ  
            if RREQ_neigh(i) == RREQ_pkt(3) %If neighbor node is 
destination 
                pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_neigh(i), RREQ_pkt(2), 2, 256, seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i)), 0, 0, 
RREQ_pkt(9)]]; 
                seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i)) = seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i))+1; 
            else 
                pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_pkt(2:6), delay, 0, RREQ_pkt(9)]];  
            end 
            %update_route_table(RREQ_neigh(i), fin_add);    %Update the 
route table of receiving node 
            delay = randi(size(RREQ_neigh)) * txmit_times(3); 
            %delay = delay + txmit_times(1); 
        end 
        update_route_table(RREQ_neigh(i), fin_add);    %Update the 
route table of receiving node 






function flood_mod(RREQ_pkt, fin_add) 
%This function is called upon a node’s completion of transmitting a 
RREQ 
%packet. It finds its neighbor nodes that have not forwarded it this  
%particular RREQ packet and adds them to pending_txmit (type = RREQ).  
%It is passed the row from ‘txmitting’ of the node which has completed 
%transmitting and the row index. Modified LOADng. 
  









if RREQ_pkt(1) == RREQ_pkt(2)   %If node is the source 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 1:3) = [RREQ_pkt(6) time_out RREQ_pkt(1)]; 
%Add this RREQ to ‘RREQ_fwd’ 
end 
  
if RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 2) <=0    %If timeout exceeded 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) = 0;  %Clear RREQ_fwd for this RREQ 
    %Find all pending_txmit nodes for this RREQ (same seq num) 
    RREQ_exp = find(pending_txmit(:, 6) == RREQ_pkt(6)); 
    %Clear all pending_txmit and txmitting nodes for this RREQ 
    pending_txmit(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
    RREQ_exp = find(txmitting(:, 6) == RREQ_pkt(6)); 
    txmitting(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
    return;     %Exit the function 
end 
  
%Add tx_complete node to RREQ_fwd    
ind = find(RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) == 0, 1);   %Index of first zero in 
row 
RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), ind) = RREQ_pkt(1); 
  
%Find all neighbors not in RREQ_fwd 
neigh_temp = neigh(RREQ_pkt(1), 1:2:size(neigh, 2));   %Get neighbor 
addresses 
%Find neighbor nodes that haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = ~ismember(neigh_temp, RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 
3:size(RREQ_fwd, 2))); 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh .* neigh_temp;  %Only choose neighbors that 
haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh(RREQ_neigh ~= 0); %Clear zero elements 
if ismember(1, neigh_temp) && ~ismember(1, RREQ_neigh) 
%If the sink node is a neighbor and has previously forwarded the RREQ  




    delay = 0; 
    for i = 1:length(RREQ_neigh)    %Neighbor nodes to pending_trans 
(type = RREQ) 
        if ~ismember(RREQ_neigh(i), pending_txmit(:, 1)) 
        %If the neighbor node is not already in pending_txmit for this 
RREQ  
            if RREQ_neigh(i) == RREQ_pkt(3) && RREQ_neigh(i) ~= 1 && 
RREQ_pkt(9) ~= 1 %Difference from flood routine 
            %If neighbor node is destination && not the sink node && 
not 
            %sink flood 
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                pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_neigh(i), RREQ_pkt(2), 2, 256, seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i)), 0, 0, 
RREQ_pkt(9)]]; 
                seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i)) = seq_nos(RREQ_neigh(i))+1; 
            else 
                pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_pkt(2:6), delay, 0, RREQ_pkt(9)]];  
            end 
            %update_route_table(RREQ_neigh(i), fin_add);    %Update the 
route table of receiving node 
            delay = randi(size(RREQ_neigh)) * txmit_times(3); 
            %delay = delay + txmit_times(3);     %Add jitter 
        end 
        update_route_table(RREQ_neigh(i), fin_add);    %Update the 
route table of receiving node 






function sink_flood(RREQ_pkt, fin_add) 
%This function is called upon the sink node’s completion of 
transmitting a  
%RREQ packet. It first finds all of its neighbor nodes that have not  
%forwarded it this particular RREQ packet. It then adds itself to the 
%list, randomly chooses a node from the list, alters the RREQ to 
reflect  
%this new source, and continues flooding the RREQ. It then adds the 
%neighbor nodes to pending_txmit (type = RREQ). It is passed the row 
from  
%’txmitting’ of the node which has completed transmitting and the row 
index. 
  









if RREQ_pkt(1) == RREQ_pkt(2)   %If node is the source 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 1:3) = [RREQ_pkt(6) time_out RREQ_pkt(1)]; 
%Add this RREQ to ‘RREQ_fwd’ 
end 
  
if RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 2) <=0    %If timeout exceeded 
    RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) = 0;  %Clear RREQ_fwd for this RREQ 
    RREQ_exp = find(pending_txmit(:, 6) == RREQ_pkt(6)); 
    %Clear all pending_txmit nodes for this RREQ 
    pending_txmit(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
    txmitting(RREQ_exp, :) = []; 
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    return;     %Exit the function 
end 
  
%Add tx_complete node to RREQ_fwd     
ind = find(RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), :) == 0, 1);   %Index of first zero in 
row 
RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), ind) = RREQ_pkt(1); 
  
%Find all neighbors not in RREQ_trans 
neigh_temp = neigh(RREQ_pkt(1), 1:2:size(neigh, 2));   %Get neighbor 
addresses 
%Find neighbor nodes that haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = ~ismember(neigh_temp, RREQ_fwd(RREQ_pkt(2), 
3:size(RREQ_fwd, 2)));   
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh .* neigh_temp;  %Only choose neighbors that 
haven’t forwarded RREQ 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh(RREQ_neigh ~= 0); %Clear zero elements 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh(route_table_sink(RREQ_neigh, RREQ_pkt(2)) > 0);    
%Make sure nodes had route to source 
if isempty(RREQ_neigh) || randi(2) == 1    %Choose to add sink 33% of 
the time 
    RREQ_neigh= horzcat(RREQ_neigh, 1);    %Add sink node to the array 
end 
%Choose random neighbor 
rand_neigh = RREQ_neigh(randi(size(RREQ_neigh, 2))); 
%Alter RREQ packet (new dest and sink bit == 1) 
RREQ_pkt([3 9]) = [rand_neigh 1]; 
%Remove sink node to prevent loading sink RREQ back into pending_txmit 
RREQ_neigh = RREQ_neigh(RREQ_neigh>1);  
  
if ismember(rand_neigh, pending_txmit(:, 1))    %If the chosen node is 
in pending_txmit 
    %Remove the node from pending_txmit 
    pending_txmit(find(pending_txmit(:, 1) == rand_neigh), :) = []; 
end 
  
%Put into pending_txmit 
if rand_neigh == 1  %If sink chose self 
    pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [1, 1, RREQ_pkt(2), 2, 256, 
seq_nos(1), 0, 0, RREQ_pkt(9)]]; 
    return;     %Leave routine. Don’t want to flood anymore 
end 
  
%Decrement hop-limit to lower chance of sink node being used in return 
route 
RREQ_pkt(5) = RREQ_pkt(5) - 1;   
  
if ~isempty(RREQ_neigh) 
    delay = 0; 
    for i = 1:length(RREQ_neigh)    %Neighbor nodes to pending_trans 
(type = RREQ) 
        if RREQ_neigh(i) == RREQ_pkt(3) %If neighbor node is 
destination 
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            pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_neigh(i), RREQ_pkt(2), 2, 256, seq_nos(RREQ_pkt(3)), delay, 0, 
RREQ_pkt(9)]]; 
            seq_nos(RREQ_pkt(3)) = seq_nos(RREQ_pkt(3))+1; 
        elseif ~ismember(RREQ_neigh(i), pending_txmit(:, 1)) 
            %If not the destination and the node is not in 
pending_txmit 
            pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [RREQ_neigh(i), 
RREQ_pkt(2:6), delay, 0, RREQ_pkt(9)]]; 
            delay = delay + txmit_times(3); 
        end 
        update_route_table(RREQ_neigh(i), fin_add);    %Update the 
route table of receiving node 






function unicast(next_hop, txmit_pkt, fin_add) 
%This function is called when the packet is a type that is sent via a 
%unicast.  “next_hop” is the next hop.  “txmit_pkt” is the line from 
%”txmitting” for the node in question. 
  












delay = 0; 
if txmit_pkt(1) == txmit_pkt(2) 
    trans_tot(2, run+1) = trans_tot(2, run+1) + 1; 
end 
if next_hop == txmit_pkt(3) %If next hop is dest 
    latency(run+1) = latency(run+1) + node_latency(txmit_pkt(2)); %Add 
packet latency to total 
    trans_tot(1, run+1) = trans_tot(1, run+1) + 1;  %Increment 
trans_tot 
    if ~isempty(pending_response) 
        resp = find(pending_response(:, 1) == next_hop);    %Check if 
dest is pending a response  
        if ~isempty(resp)   %If node pending response           
            pending_response(resp, :) = [];   %Remove from 
pending_response 
        end 
    end 
    sink_flag = txmit_pkt(9); 
 69 
    switch txmit_pkt(4) 
        case 2  %RREP, respond with RREP_ACK then data 
            pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [next_hop, next_hop, 
txmit_pkt(2), 4, 256, seq_nos(next_hop), 0, 0, txmit_pkt(9)]]; 
            seq_nos(next_hop) = seq_nos(next_hop) + 1; 
            fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, node: %d, from: %d, type: 
RREP;\n’, timer, next_hop, txmit_pkt(2)); 
            pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [next_hop, next_hop, 
txmit_pkt(2), 3, 256, seq_nos(next_hop), txmit_times(4), 0, 
txmit_pkt(9)]]; 
            seq_nos(next_hop) = seq_nos(next_hop) + 1; 
        case 3  %Data, respond with ACK 
            if sink_flag  
                pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [next_hop, 
txmit_pkt(2), 65535, txmit_pkt(4:9)]]; 
                pending_txmit(end, 3) = 65535; 
                delay = txmit_times(3); 
            end 
            pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [next_hop, next_hop, 
txmit_pkt(2), 6, 256, seq_nos(next_hop), delay, 0, txmit_pkt(9)]]; 
            seq_nos(next_hop) = seq_nos(next_hop) + 1;      
            fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, node: %d, from: %d, type: 
Data;\n’, timer, next_hop, txmit_pkt(2)); 
        case 4  %RREP_ACK 
            fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, node: %d, from: %d, type: 
RREP_ACK;\n’, timer, next_hop, txmit_pkt(2)); 
        case 5  %RERR 
            fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, node: %d, from: %d, type: 
RERR;\n’, timer, next_hop, txmit_pkt(2)); 
        case 6  %ACK 
            fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, node: %d, from: %d, type: 
ACK;\n’, timer, next_hop, txmit_pkt(2)); 
            success(next_hop) = success(next_hop) + 1; 
    end 
else    %Next hop not dest 
    if isempty(pending_txmit)   %If pending_txmit = [] 
        pending_txmit = [next_hop, txmit_pkt(2:6), 0, 0, txmit_pkt(9)]; 
    else 
        pending_txmit = [pending_txmit; [next_hop, txmit_pkt(2:6), 0, 
0, txmit_pkt(9)]]; 
    end 
end 
if run == 0 && txmit_pkt(1) == 1 && txmit_pkt(2) ~= 1 
    txmitting(fin_add, 5) = txmitting(fin_add, 5) - 1; 
end 















neigh_temp = neigh(txmit_pkt(1), 1:2:size(neigh, 2)); %Get node 
neighbor addresses 
fprintf(‘%f: Broadcast, node: %d, source: %d, type: %d;\n’, timer, 
txmit_pkt(1), txmit_pkt(2), txmit_pkt(4)); 
  
if txmit_pkt(1) == 1 || ismember(1, neigh_temp) 
    fprintf(‘%f: Packet received, dest: %d;\n’, timer, txmit_pkt(3)); 
    latency(run+1) = latency(run+1) + txmit_times(txmit_pkt(4)); %Add 
time to latency 
else 






function update_route_table(node, ind) 
%This function updates that routing tables based on the transmitted 
packet. 
%’node’ is the node address that is being updated.  ‘ind’ is used to 







if node ~= 1    %If not the sink node 
    %Update neighbor route 
    route_table(1, txmitting(ind, 1), node) = txmitting(ind, 1); 
    route_table(2, txmitting(ind, 1), node) = 1; 
    if node == txmitting(ind, 3) && txmitting(ind, 4) == 2 && 
txmitting(ind, 1) == txmitting(ind, 2) 
    %If rvc node is dest AND type == RREP AND neighbor == source 
        route_table(3, txmitting(ind, 1), node) = txmitting(ind, 9); 
    end 
    if (route_table(1, txmitting(ind, 2), node)==0) || ((256-
txmitting(ind, 5)) < route_table(2, txmitting(ind, 2), node)) 
    %If no existing route to source OR route is less hops than the 
current route 
        %Update source route 
        route_table(1, txmitting(ind, 2), node) = txmitting(ind, 1); 
        route_table(2, txmitting(ind, 2), node) = 256-txmitting(ind, 
5); 
    end 
    if node == txmitting(ind, 3) && txmitting(ind, 4) == 2 && 
txmitting(ind, 9) == 1 
    %If rcv node is dest AND type == RREP AND packet sink flag is set 
        route_table(3, txmitting(ind, 2), node) = txmitting(ind, 9); 
    end 
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else        %Sink node 
    %Update neighbor route 
    route_table_sink(txmitting(ind, 1), txmitting(ind, 1)) = 1; 
    if (route_table_sink(txmitting(ind, 1), txmitting(ind, 2))==0) || 
(route_table_sink(txmitting(ind, 1), txmitting(ind, 2)) > 256-
txmitting(ind, 5)); 
    %If no existing route to source OR route is less hops than the 
current route 
        route_table_sink(txmitting(ind, 1), txmitting(ind, 2)) = 256-
txmitting(ind, 5); 
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